posted 03-31-2009 04:44 AM               

If the test had been completed before the fire, then those specific circumstances may not have occurred again. Remember, you had the cabin pressurised to some 18-20 PSI with O2. I don't know if any of the other pre-flight tests involved a pressure test, but if not then you would have removed a major "link" in the chain of events.

The review board was never able to conclusively determine the ignition source, so it's difficult to say but I would imagine the circumstances which lead to the short circuit / spark in the wiring probably would happen again.

The next factor is the glycol leak: would it have happened again? Possibly, possibly not. Even if both the spark and the glycol leak happened again simultaneously, the fire propagation in a 3.5 PSI O2 atmosphere would have been very different. I am not sure how different, but it may have meant that the crew might have had enough time to either egress the spacecraft or dump the cabin pressure and fight the fire (if on the ground).

posted 03-31-2009 01:51 PM               

The best case scenario is that the wiring would have been found and people would have taken a step back and said "Whoa, look at what could have happened." But it's also just as likely that the bad wiring would have been quietly repaired and the testing/flight of Apollo 1 would have continued...and the improvements that came about as result of the fire may have never occurred (perhaps putting future crews in danger). Hard to say, really...

posted 03-31-2009 02:12 PM               

The cabin pressure integrity test was a standard prelaunch test (to 16.7 psi if I remember right). So for Apollo 204 it would have been rerun during the final launch count after the crew hatch had been sealed. And if the fire didn't happen then, every subsequent crew would have gone through the same test during their launch count, and probably even more during prelaunch testing.

posted 04-07-2009 06:15 AM               

According to John Young, Grissom's reply was that he was concerned but moreso about losing his place on the test if he complained.

Thus, it seems there was great concern that it could be an accident waiting to happen.

posted 04-08-2009 02:31 PM               

No corporation will ever start off with the very best components, unless the government agrees to pay the 'freight'. American corporations are in the business of making profits, which attract more shareholders, which increases the possibility of realizing future profits.

Again, if a company offers a safer or more beneficial system, Congress would still have to approve it.

Since they answer to their constituents, they will vote almost always on the side that ensures their re-election.

That is why and how NASA got the shuttle(s) it did, rather than the one they required for the initial performance specifications.

Congressional budget constraints.

It's a sad fact that decisions are only revisited (concerning the American space program) in lieu of loss of life, or catastrophic mission failure.

Had Apollo 1 been lost in space, and not on the ground, investigators would have had no physical evidence to analyse.

posted 04-08-2009 07:18 PM               

In recent years, the study of aviation safety has centered around the "swiss cheese" model of Reason which analogizes a set of independent, unrelated conditions (holes in the cheese) lining up at an inopportune time to allow a line to be drawn through them (accident).

Remove any one of the holes, and the line is blocked, the accident prevented. Apollo 1 was a perfect example of a set of conditions lining up which no one saw at the time, but in retrospect seem painfully obvious. Poor hatch design, pure O2, substandard wiring, poor workmanship and quality control, and schedule pressures all conspired to kill three astronauts.

Another concept demonstrated by Challenger and Columbia is the "drift toward failure." We've gotten away with it so long, that we believe we have a handle on it. We relax our restrictions and let our guard down until it comes back and bites us.

This is something I think about everytime I hear a NASA engineer refer to a condition as being "in family." I agree that we learn something everytime we fly the vehicle, and certain risks are acceptable if thoroughly understood. But ET foam loss was considered to be "in family" prior to Columbia. Of course, after the near disaster of STS-27, what damage couldn't be considered "in family?"

We saw the "drift toward failure" on a much larger scale when Challenger-type management decisions resurfaced and led to the Columbia accident.

It seems that lessons learned from past events don't always get passed down to the generations of engineers that follow. While I know that no one will ever lock astronauts in an inescapable spacecraft pumped full of O2 at high pressure again, I worry that the same faulty safety culture which led to this will again produce similar results.

The CAIB report really broke new ground in utilizing the latest accepted theories of safety culture and did not lead the reader down the faulty path of a "smoking gun" answer to the accident.

posted 04-13-2009 03:47 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Apollo Redux:
The fire was tragic, but likely not only inevitable, but necessary for the ultimate success of Apollo.

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posted 04-13-2009 05:08 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Apollo Redux:
The fire was tragic, but likely not only inevitable, but necessary for the ultimate success of Apollo.

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I've heard this repeated many times before, but I don't necessarily buy the argument that the fire was "necessary" for the success of Apollo. Had the wiring in the Apollo 1 capsule never gotten worn/damaged to the point of creating the spark that caused the fire, it's quite conceivable that Apollo 1 could have flown successfully. And since the improved Block 2 capsules were soon to replace the Block 1 capsules, it's also conceivable that NASA could have moved onto Block 2 before a tragedy occurred.

Keep in mind that the pressurized 100% oxygen atmosphere was also a part of Mercury and Gemini too...and few could argue that those programs weren't a success. It's quite possible that Apollo could have tested and flown successfully with 100% oxygen, just like Mercury and Gemini did (even if it wasn't an ideal environment).

posted 04-14-2009 02:39 AM               

Could it have occurred at a later date, perhaps during flight? Certainly - but the conditions would have been different and the outcome may have been different.

posted 04-14-2009 12:47 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Apollo Redux:
The fire was tragic, but likely not only inevitable, but necessary for the ultimate success of Apollo.

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Let's look at what are really three seperate issues:

1. The fire itself was inevitable: No, it wasn't. As we have discussed above, many things could have been done to prevent it from occurring. If I fill a bottle with gas, stuff a rag in it and light it, it's inevitable that a fire will occur. Quality workmanship, tight quality control, and good design should have prevented the combination of electrical short, flammable materials, and environmental conditions which caused the Apollo 1 fire.

2. The fire was necessary for the ultimate success of Apollo: NASA, NAA, and all of the contractors learned alot about their design from the fire, but others here have stated that in the absence of it, Apollo may have marched forward and "gotten away with" the pure O2 concept all the way throught he conclusion of the program. No one really knows, any more than one can say that a similar event likely would have happened during a flight. Block 1 and Block 2 spacecraft were very different, and in either case, operated at a much lower 5 PSI in space, making an uncontrollable fire much less likely.

3. Loss of the crew: All other conditions being the same, with a properly designed hatch the fire still could have occurred, yet without losing Grissom, White, and Chaffee. Once the hatch popped open, venting the lethal environment and allowing emergency personnel access, the fire damage would not have been as severe, and the hull would likely not have ruptured.

So Reason's model (remember the "swiss cheese"?) could apply to two different events: the cause of the fire, and the loss of the crew. Both lead to the same outcome...delay, redesign, and the ultimate success of Apollo. But if one fault (hole in the cheese) could have prevented the loss of the crew, it would obviously be that hatch.

posted 04-16-2009 06:08 PM               

To take it a step father, I believe the notion that the Apollo 1 fire was "necessary" was born out of the desire to attach a special significance to the deaths of the crew...hoping that their sacrifice insured a successful moon landing before the end of the decade. In that respect, I can understand the desire to attach that meaning to their deaths, since nobody wants to think of their deaths as an unnecessary waste that could have been avoided.

posted 04-25-2009 09:34 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by BMacKinnon:
He stated that there was a lever in the capsule by the commander that could have been turned to isolate the astronauts from the toxic gases created by the fire and that might have saved their lives. We need to throw this into the mix of "What If".

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There was a cabin pressure release valve located on the side panel near Grissom's left arm, and there are indications that it was turned. However, the pressure was so intense in the capsule that according to "Apollo by the Numbers", it would have only delayed the rupture of the cabin by less than a second.

I am not sure if that's what the speaker meant by the lever he mentioned.

posted 04-26-2009 09:25 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by BMacKinnon:
He stated that there was a lever in the capsule by the commander that could have been turned to isolate the astronauts from the toxic gases created by the fire and that might have saved their lives.

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