posted 04-18-2016 12:50 AM               

Wally Schirra told the ground much the same thing on Apollo 7. His crew were castigated by Slayton and never made another flight.

posted 04-18-2016 05:13 AM            

I've often wondered about the 'none of them flew again' statement. It's widely reported that this was a definite decision, but is it recorded anywhere or just assumed?

posted 04-18-2016 05:45 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by moorouge:
Stafford left no doubt that he would not follow that instruction.

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Fortunately for history, Stafford, nor any other Gemini command pilot, had to make this call, or override a contrary call from Mission Control. But had he (or any of the others) been put in this scenario, it would have almost assuredly been (a) considered based on the outcome and the gravitas of the situation, and (b) resulted in Mission Control asserting its ultimate command as part of the post-flight recovery.

posted 04-18-2016 07:20 AM            

quote:

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Originally posted by moorouge:
It was over what course of action was required of him in the event of a specific happening in the course of the '9' flight.

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In any event, he didn't, in my opinion receive a direct unambiguous order to basically kill them both rather than embarrass NASA. In no version I've heard does Slayton state "you are being ordered, do you understand?" or similar formal wording. He also never responds with anything like "are you disobeying an order?"

posted 04-18-2016 10:17 AM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Rusty53:
In my opinion, it bordered on being unprofessional.

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posted 04-18-2016 02:03 PM            

In Tom Stafford's autobiography "We Have Capture," on page 88, Deke Slayton has a private word with Stafford saying "NASA management has decided that if Cernan dies up there, we can't afford to have a dead astronaut floating around in space. You've got to bring him back."

Cernan's version in his autobiography, from which I quote, states that in the event of him being incapacitated Deke told Tom the only choice would be to cut me loose, close the hatch and return to Earth without me.

posted 04-20-2016 12:03 PM               

As far as spaceflight is concerned, the decisions, real or hypothetical, taken by Gemini 4 and Apollo 9 commander Jim McDivitt bear some examination. I'm sure he had a lot of discussions with mission managers — and Ed White — about the scenarios if White would have been incapacitated during his spacewalk on Gemini 4. It would have been a terrible decision, as McDivitt himself has said in interviews, to cut loose and abandon his best friend.

And the EVA could have turned out almost like Gemini 9A's: In the official Gemini history On the Shoulders of Titans, White returned to the cabin exhausted, sweat going in his eyes and his faceplate fogged over. If this would have happened during the EVA, I'm sure McDivitt would have curtailed it early like Stafford did on 9A. Only White's athletic training and physical condition saved the day, I think.

On Apollo 9, Rusty Schweickart's sickness almost scrapped the planned EVA outside the LM to test the PLSS backpack, but McDivitt made a judgment call after seeing that Rusty was feeling better and could proceed with a modified EVA plan. A wise call by the mission commander.

posted 04-20-2016 01:09 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by onesmallstep:
I'm sure one of the positive outcomes of that was the crew scheduling for future space station missions like those on ISS.

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posted 04-20-2016 01:15 PM               

"We dealt with problems having to do with scheduling and productivity," said Gerald "Jerry" Carr, who commanded the final Skylab crew. "We came to some solutions that worked very well. It took a while to get there... but those solutions that we came across were used on subsequent missions to some degree."

"We tried to make sure that got into the planning for the operations aboard the International Space Station and on the [space] shuttle," Carr added.

"I think we're still working that issue," replied [Kevin] Ford. "We've gotten a much better feeling, I think, now that we are up there to do work that the ground can't necessarily figure out how long it is going to take you to do everything."

posted 04-20-2016 05:53 PM            

I have argued (in "Footprints in the Dust" and on this forum) that Mission Control may have withheld the news specifically to avoid a "who's in charge" argument. Had Scott been told, he has made it clear that he would have had a full and detailed debate with Mission Control about the issue.

posted 04-21-2016 01:42 AM               

On top of this Schirra developed a cold and both Cunningham and Eisele displayed similar symptoms probably caused by breathing the pure oxygen in the cabin.

The eighth day saw hostilities with Mission Control renewed after the postponed tv show. They started as Donn Eisele removed his bio-medical harness as there were parts that were running hot. Already the crew had to mend loose and broken wiring several times and, backed by Schirra, Eisele had had enough. They reached the "bitter end" and, mindful of the spark that caused the Apollo 1 fire, refused to undertake any more repairs.

Cunningham too was beginning to rebel having had his fill of 'Mickey Mouse' operations. At one point, when told that a test might require him to repeat an operation forty times he replied, "I would like to go on record here by saying that people who dress up procedures like this after lift-off have somehow or other been dropping the ball the past three years."

Schirra supported his crew by saying a little later, "I wish you would find out the name of the idiot who thought of this test. I want to talk to him personally when I get down." He followed this with a final, "I've had it up here and from now on I'm going to be an onboard flight director for the updates." This, as one can imagine, did not go down well at Houston, though there were those who quietly supported Schirra's stand, agreeing that officials should listen to the opinions of the astronauts.

The final cause of friction came with re-entry when Schirra won his argument with Slayton that the crew would not wear helmets so they could clear their noses.

Following this there were hints also picked up by the press in Houston that Schirra was to face a full "normal" inquiry on his return to the Manned Spacecraft Centre to settle the recurring theme of the flight as to who had ultimate control.

posted 04-21-2016 09:02 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Robert Pearlman:
...the same issue that resulted in the Skylab disagreement persists to some degree today on orbit.

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posted 04-21-2016 09:06 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by moorouge:
This flight was intended as an open-ended mission lasting up to ten days. All the major objectives were accomplished in the first few days...

From the above it can be argued that there was just cause for the crew to be somewhat testy and that they were placed under greater stress from the ground caused by changes made on the spur of the moment to the flight plan than any crew either before or since.

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posted 04-23-2016 01:01 AM               

The commander of a manned mission could initiate any inflight action (including abort) that he deemed necessary for crew safety.

If this was in place for the Apollo 7 flight, then Schirra was clearly within his rights to query some of Mission Control requests. Or was this rule introduced following the '7' flight to clarify the situation as a result of the disagreements.

In both cases I come back to my original point that it would seem to be grossly unfair for the powers that be to take it out on the crew of a commander who was merely exercising his rights. Or did Mission Control and Slayton take exception to the fact that Schirra, Cunningham and Eisele wanted to test the limitations of this mission rule?

posted 04-23-2016 05:26 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by moorouge:
If this was in place for the Apollo 7 flight, then Schirra was clearly within his rights to query some of Mission Control requests.

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posted 04-23-2016 08:14 PM               

In aviation the captain is the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft. Wally was the commander of Apollo 7 and obviously felt he was the final authority as to the operation of the first flight after the fire of the test flight of the Apollo spacecraft.

I'm a 767 captain and my "final authority" is always challenged by management when I have to make a tough decision. Insert management with Mission Control.

Wally knew he was retiring, lost his best friend on the pad he just blasted off from, had a cold and he felt lousy. He was the man in command, Mission Control be damned regarding flight plan changes and last minute experiments added and Donn and Walt were obviously on their own.

Wally flew on Mercury aboard Sigma 7 when Atlas boosters blew up. He made a instant decision not to pull the D ring and eject on Gemini 6. And then he signed up to back up Gus on Apollo.

posted 04-24-2016 02:17 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Jim Behling:
There was no matter of safety in the requests Mission Control (except for the helmet issue), so Wally didn't have a leg to stand on.

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They started as Donn Eisele removed his bio-medical harness as there were parts that were running hot. Already the crew had to mend loose and broken wiring several times and, backed by Schirra, Eisele had had enough. They reached the "bitter end" and, mindful of the spark that caused the Apollo 1 fire, refused to undertake any more repairs.

posted 04-24-2016 08:29 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Alf767:
Mission Control be damned regarding flight plan changes and last minute experiments added and Donn and Walt were obviously on their own.

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posted 04-24-2016 09:15 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by moorouge:
I refer back to the LMRD document...

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In the event of communications loss between the Manned Space Flight Network and the spacecraft, the command pilot will assume responsibility for mission conduct as described within the flight rules.

In fact, the document states it even clearer:

When a conflict of flight plan activities occurs, the flight director will determine the priority of activities.

posted 04-24-2016 01:20 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Alf767:
In aviation the captain is the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft. Wally was the commander of Apollo 7 and obviously felt he was the final authority as to the operation of the first flight after the fire of the test flight of the Apollo spacecraft.

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For convenience, "the operation of the aircraft" may be divided into safety and mission. Depending on the organisation employing you in a command role it is typical for the commander to have the final authority on the day with regards to safety. He or she may have to subsequently argue their decisions with management. Should you find your point of view does not align with management repeatedly for whatever reasons, you may find your employment terminated. It is less common (for example in a major airline) for the aircraft commander to have final authority as to the mission. The machine is not your personal property to do with as you please, it is loaned to you whilst you are entrusted to do a job.

To take an extreme example, imagine you are a commander of a Huge Airlines Boeing 767. You are scheduled to fly from JFK to LAX with a load of passengers. You are unlikely to have the authority to decide to leave the passengers behind, load up with cargo and fly to DFW. However, at the gate the company may tell you they need that jet in DFW and you're operating a different flight number on the same aircraft. In this case you retain safety authority from chock to chock, but are required to execute the flight (mission) assigned to you in accordance with company and FAA regulations. However, if as you taxi out a thunderstorm moves in with reports of severe windshear and out of limit winds on the departure runway you not only have the authority to delay takeoff, you are required to make that decision. Between these extremes you may have the authority to decide between taking/offloading passengers and accepting minor delays, etc. — or you may not.

In a different world you may be tasked to use your F/A-18 to destroy a specific target regardless of cost. There will be an original plan, but things change. Here you have authority to achieve the objective in whatever way you see fit, and are absolved from the responsibility of having to bring your airplane back in one piece.

Obviously the above is an oversimplification to illustrate the difference between safety and mission. Every organisation and situation is different. Flight test itself adds a load of considerations not normally applicable to operational vehicles.

Similarly, it is important to recognise the difference between spacecraft command, mission command, or the vague term "flight command". These have evolved over the history of aviation and spaceflight. In the old days the Captain was pretty much it. That has not been the case in most organisations for a very long time. It was not, and is not the case at NASA, although personalities on both sides of the line tested the limits of their authority.