posted 06-26-2007 12:02 PM               

This post is a spoof and I’m too slow to get it, right? Right?

Engineers and Scientists make deductions or conclusions based on facts and mathematics. They don’t turn in their weekly time sheets without the facts and math to back them up. They pride themselves on being accurate and complete. Their spouses call it ‘Anal’.

“OK, maybe we space journalists cannot judge technical matters amongst the engineers...but we can read.”

Then Don’t! If you can’t judge the technical matters you are reading, how can you comment? Please don’t answer…

A scientist once said (F=ma). Of course this was probably a conspiracy to help him get funding from a corrupt government. Let’s just assume he was right and look at some simple numbers.

A shuttle stack weighs approximately 4.5 million pounds at liftoff. The three main engines combined produce roughly 1.1 million pounds of thrust (the jumping on the scale part) to Twang, cause Dynamic overshoot, and Dynamic strain. Once all this overstressing is done, the SRB’s light, which only provide an additional 6.6 MILLION pounds of thrust! (Someone please check my facts before we get accused of starting another conspiracy.) Any good theorists will plug these numbers into the above equation and decide how many beer cans it takes to handle all those ‘Twang’ Stresses. Then he could provide his technical analysis to NASA because apparently, they never looked at this!

Once the shuttle is climbing, it goes through a phase called “Max Q”. Now I suspect an experienced space journalists can tell you what that is, but do you know what the equation is, or the name of the terms in the equation, or what those terms represent….We won’t mention what forces are created going through the sound barrier, or compare them with those liftoff forces, out of memory of all the great test pilots that gave their lives helping us understand them. Oh wait, we probably knew what they were doing, we just needed to cover it up for some reason.

To even question the skill or professionalism of Dick Scobee and Mike Smith is an insult to all fact based Science, Engineering, and Journalism. To question the skill, professionalism or ethics of the Scientists, Engineers, Pilots, and Journalists on the Rogers Commission is pouring salt in an unnecessary wound.

Someone please tell me this work “A Life in Space” is fiction and the joke is on me for not getting it…

posted 06-26-2007 03:38 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Tim Furniss:
Regards to all from a perfectly normal and well respected space journalist.

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To be frank, "well respected space journalist" is an honored opinion given by others, not something one can give to oneself.

In my opinion - I would certainly agree that you earned it for your stellar work in the 1980s and 1990s, as one of the best, public, accessible media journalists, particularly making manned space flight fun and understandable to children. Your popular audience books such as "One Small Step" really brought the humanity and personalities of the astronauts to life for me, and books such as "Manned Spaceflight Log" were invaluable touchstones in the pre-internet age, particularly in the equal weighting given to the Soviet space program and the humanizing of their efforts also. You were one of the people who sparked my interest in space, and for that I am eternally grateful.

Which is why this thread has been so sad and distressing for me to read. By your own words and postings, (never mind the responses and enquiries of some very well-respected, authoritative voices on this thread) I now have to seriously question your credibility on the subjects of engineering, space history and science. As someone who has respected your work all of my life, it's a sad thing for me to have to consider - but, by your own actions and words, has become necessary.

posted 06-26-2007 04:03 PM            

What you wrote in your last post is spot on, it's exactly the same thing that I think. The first book I ever bought was "Manned Spaceflight Log" way back in the early eighties, I must have read the ink off the pages because I read them so much. I also loved "One Small Step" and was so glad to finally own a copy after buying it off ebay.

posted 06-27-2007 12:03 AM               

The first was the whole bit about the RTLS. In order to that the "Abort" button is pushed, and this sends the computers into the Major Mode appropriate to the type of abort. This is part of the telemetry. So to verify this what Major Mode was Challenger in at 73 sec. when telemetry was lost ? It would be logical that Mr. Scobee would have selected an Abort mode (RTLS) in the seconds after telemetry was lost, not knowing the condition of the vehicle more or less as a conditioned reflex. But we will never know.

Secondly, "fishtailing" that could be felt by the crew would be registered by the GNC systems, also a part of telemetry. I might be off on this one, but wasn't this data on body axis deviations published in the commisions reports (like way at the end of the second or third volume ?)As I recall, the right SRB was producing a very small lateral thrust that was compensated for by steering in the main engines. In fact, they estimated this lateral thrust by how much the engine steering had to compensate. Would this compensation process happen to fast for the crew to feel it ?

posted 06-27-2007 02:32 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by DDAY:
To reiterate, SP has a reputation for several things

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quote:

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-they send book proposals out for review, but not the actual manuscripts

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quote:

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-much of their work (with some exceptions) is rehashed from the works of other authors who do much of the research and get little credit in the SP books (it's worth asking--how can some of these authors produce _so_ much stuff in such a short period of time?)

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quote:

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-some of their books have come dangerously close to plagiarism; at the very least they have used substantial amounts of material from other books without attribution

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Some of the above is based upon my first-hand observations and some of it I have heard from other space historians whose names you would recognize.

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Although my post may sound personal, it's not. I very much appreciate your articles and comments/remarks. But you have to accept the fact that Springer books are not written by historians for historians and consequently, you and Springer live in two different worlds.

Last but not least, the whole Turniss/Challenger episode cast a negative shadow on Springer books but that doesn't mean that all Springer books should be thrown away. After all two books come directly from NASA's Apollo Journals so....

posted 06-27-2007 04:47 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by cspg:
And if space history books are meant to be written by historians for historians only, then I don't see the point of having such work published. As a historian, your job is to research and provide the results to the population (Aren't historians supposed to educate? Or are they just supposed to impress their own kind?). At least that's what my understanding is (was)- and expectations. But apparently that's not the case. You'd rather remain in your ivory tower with your historian colleagues.

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Hope you don't mind this "historian colleague" (albeit not a space historian) stepping in. To tell you the truth I'm not sure what aspect of Dwayne's argument you're picking on. Of course historians are supposed to educate and to share the fruits of their research... that seems to me to be exactly what Dwayne is doing with his Space Review articles, among other things. But the reason why we go through years of training in order to be able to call ourselves historians is because we have to learn how to adhere to the high standards of scholarship that the historical profession upholds.

posted 06-27-2007 09:57 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Spoon:

A seperate thread on Springer Praxis books has touched upon the, on occasion, lack of editorial control over authors of some of their published output. This could be the worst example. Referencing these allegations as such could be acceptable if they were reported secondary to the Rogers Commisions findings. On this occasion, the offical investigation is only given a brief mention, stating that its findings were in error.
Ian

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Ian,

apparently we're not reading the same book. I've just read the entry for 51-L and it never says that the findings were in error. It states however that "Analyses of the accident by several engineers were refuted by NASA (...)"- suggesting that other factors were to be taken into account. Unless I'm wrong.

posted 06-27-2007 10:29 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by cspg:
What a severe blow to Springer-Praxis' reputation...Should we keep buying their books? That's really bad news.

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posted 06-27-2007 10:54 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by cspg:
That's your side of the story, I've been told otherwise.

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quote:

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So if your assessments are based solely on gossip and hearsay, you might want to rethink your claims and it undermines your argument as to how a "proper" history book ought to be written. And if space history books are meant to be written by historians for historians only, then I don't see the point of having such work published. As a historian, your job is to research and provide the results to the population (Aren't historians supposed to educate? Or are they just supposed to impress their own kind?). At least that's what my understanding is (was)- and expectations. But apparently that's not the case. You'd rather remain in your ivory tower with your historian colleagues. Sadly enough, I've seen such attitude in so many different fields and aspects of life (social, cultural, educational, professional, you name it) and every time it infuriated me, hence the tone of my response.

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posted 06-27-2007 04:31 PM            

It is 'The Furness issue', that I am having trouble with.

The evidence is what is lacking in Mr. Furness's stories, like the one he just mentioned: He said that Pres. Bush (I) sacked Truly upon seeing the evidence. Funny, Pres. Reagan was in charge then and Bush was vice president. Why haven't we heard more about this from Dick if that was so?

It is one thing to believe in UFO's, they are just unidentified flying objects. It is another thing when you let out the little green men.

posted 06-27-2007 05:32 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by aurora:
I have written about what I saw, the evidence I was provided with

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Then provide us with the same evidence. Show us the photographs.

quote:

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Originally posted by aurora:
If I saw a Time magazine image of Challenger during the roll programme with flame coming out of a breach in the booster - I saw it. I did not dream it.

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Okay, but don't expect us to believe it until we see it too.

quote:

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Originally posted by aurora:
I am a Christian, I tell the truth, I do not lie, I can't deny in what I see.

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Nobody is accusing you of lying. In fact, getting one's facts wrong doesn't necessarily mean it's a lie. It just means that one has their facts wrong. I suspect you're an honest man who just fell for a mistaken notion of conspiracy.

To be honest, I have no idea what the "I am a Christian" line is supposed to mean. Are you saying that if you were of some other faith, I should think twice before believing you?

quote:

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Originally posted by aurora:
I guess I am a bit too much of a good guy to be a proper journalist. I should have spoken to third parties a bit more. All that I have said goes for the Praxis book too - as I said, I spoke to, I saw, I wrote and I reported.... I think that's what a journalist is supposed to do. I can't deny what I saw. If you don't like what I wrote then that's tough. You seemed to have started an ugly witch hunt

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posted 06-28-2007 11:58 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by E2M Lem Man:
He said that Pres. Bush (I) sacked Truly upon seeing the evidence. Funny, Pres. Reagan was in charge then and Bush was vice president. Why haven't we heard more about this from Dick if that was so?

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posted 06-28-2007 03:44 PM            

This seems as bad as Scott Grissoms view about his Fathers accidental death.

posted 06-29-2007 10:52 AM            

quote:

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Originally posted by cspg:
Ian, apparently we're not reading the same book. I've just read the entry for 51-L and it never says that the findings were in error. It states however that "Analyses of the accident by several engineers were refuted by NASA (...)"- suggesting that other factors were to be taken into account. Unless I'm wrong.

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We are, I believe, reading the same book. My use of the particular phrasing that you refer to was not mentioned implicitly, as you correctly state so you can hold me to account on that point, but the overall tone of the entry infers that the Rogers Commissions findings were wrong "and, despite a mountain of evidence, decided that the only cause of the accident was failed O-rings, damaged by low temperatures before launch." I, rightly or wrongly, took that to mean that the author found the commissions' findings to be in error, especially since the report goes on to say, as you quote, "Analyses of the accident by several engineers were refuted by NASA (...)". Although he isn't mentioned by name, I imagine Abutaha was one these "several engineers".

Briefly touching on Springer books, I would like to say that the vast majority of these are marvelous publications and invaluable, such as the Apollo era books by David Harland, the Soviet/Russian editions from Brian Harvey, Rex Hall and David Shayler, the titles drawn from both the Apollo Lunar and Flight Journals by Eric Jones and David Woods, and work by Paolo Ulivi. I do, however, think that on some of the publications (none of the above I may hasten to add), the editing could have been improved.

My own subjective reasoning was that the entry on 51-L in the "Manned Spaceflight Log", as it was supposedly a tool for reference, should have stuck to facts and not resorted to supposition as the main basis for its content. If a reader wished to investigate further on their own behest and reach conclusions which are not generally accepted de facto, then that is their right. It should not be presented to them initially as truth.

posted 06-29-2007 05:42 PM               

quote:

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Hello Mr. Pearlman and everyone. This is Ali AbuTaha (#101).

Ten years ago, someone told me that rude remarks were made about my work and me on the net. I checked it out and decided not to dignify the ill informed, ill qualified and ill-mannered folks, though they belonged to respectable organizations, with answers. I had not heard from Tim Furniss for a number of years and I was happy to hear about his book and his Chapter 10 on the Challenger investigations. I respect Tim for caring about our American space program as if it were his own. All of you can claim the same. The difference is that Tim had put far more effort into understanding and disseminating potentially the biggest mistake in the history of the space program — for the benefit of our space program, our economy, our education, and our leadership in the world. Oh, you all expected me to say this and more about Tim. I hope you will read what I have to say.

Pearlman writes, "Abutaha shares the copyright." Tim asked if he could use some of my photo enhancements, diagrams, illustrations and other material in an upcoming book (to follow his eBook), and I agreed. I found it honorable of Furniss to attribute my materials to me than to shamefully claim them to be his, as he describes others had done with my work in his Challenger Chapter. I don't want to give a preview of Tim's chapter or book. I read the chapter, but I have not been able to purchase the book online because of problems mentioned in this thread. Though I avoided postings or chat rooms for a long time, I want to address specific things brought up here.

Bob writes, "Abutaha's claims were raised here in 2002 (Ali AbuTaha's STS-51L reports) to no real resolution." Did it occur to anyone to contact me to see if I could clarify some issues? If these comments are posted, and if this thread continues to reach a resolution, many will see that Tim's reporting of the Challenger investigations is a model for upstanding journalism. This is not reflected in Pearlman's review.

It is obvious that Tim is biased as Pearlman notes, "as far as he is concerned, Abutaha is correct and the Rogers Commission is wrong." That was already Tim's stated position in his numerous articles in Flight International (1986-97). Didn't anyone notice that? I admired him for crunching thousands of pages I shared with him and hours of discussion we had about complex technical issues into one page — sensible to Flight's readers. As I recall it, he always included NASA's position, which might have influenced many of you for many years. With extensive material from me, he apparently has written a lengthy chapter. If I collect all of what NASA told him, as appeared in his many excellent Flight's articles, it would all add up to one sentence, that I was an idiot.

Bob is correct that the photos need interpretation beyond that given by Tim or me. Tim mentions fire that I captured on video striking the Challenger's right wing and, more importantly, through the hinge line before the vehicle cleared the tower. This is a great claim if true, or not true. Is it true? Pearlman fails to tell you that Tim gives a specific reference for two photos of the fire under and through the wing (Spaceflight, BIS, May 1988, page 195). Study the already published photos yourselves, make up your minds, and then write about them. And if you do, do not forget to then go back to the photos of the recovered left and right wings of Challenger and carefully correlate the damage on the right wing with the fire in my pictures. And then, be imaginative, think about your next step to lead to more definitive findings.

Dwayne writes, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." Absolutely. Tim Furniss writes that I am the only person to find the crew cabin in the video. He even repeats the claim in his Challenger chapter. This is not only extraordinary, it is staggering. Pearlman, fairly I might add, writes, "there is absolutely no way in telling if yours and Abutaha's interpretation of what they show is correct." Jim Oberg mocked Tim in a message (and a posting — I don't know where), and Tim shared the message with me. I put a challenge to Jim and, now, I put it to everyone on CollectSpace as follows:

1. Find the crew cabin after the explosion in the video footage (use clues given in Tim's Chapter 10).

2. From the distance and time measurements (should be easy), calculate the horizontal velocity of the crew cabin.

3. From the momentum or other equations, calculate the g-forces that hit the crew cabin at the moment of the explosion. Then compare what NASA concluded and what Chapter 10 concludes.

4. How high did the crew cabin rise after the explosion (in meters, feet, etc.)?

5. How does Jim (and now CollectSpace) explain the "horizontal velocity" and the "height" of the crew cabin after the explosion???

The above is not bragging, and I know it is not fair to Jim or to you. I had obtained industrial quality recording of all the NASA video in the Archives and from other sources. As Tim writes, the crucial New Smyrna Beach video is not in the Archives, and other specific things are missing. Bob seems to think that that is Ok. The crew cabin is not in the New Smyrna Beach video, but the tape is useful to answer some of the above questions. This was a solemn issue for me from day one, as I am sure it was for all of you, and that is the reason you have not seen it on TV programs that I appeared on before. I have shown it privately to Tim and others. It will take everyone a split second to recognize it, when you see it. The crew cabin was tumbling thousands of feet away from what NASA identified as the crew module. And doesn't anyone remember it took 40 long days to locate the cabin? On the day of the accident, I, for one, gave NASA till 5 pm, then 7 pm, to locate the crew cabin then impatiently I said the next day, then the next week, then the end of the month. Weren't any of you around then? If a picture is worth a thousand words, this one is worth a million. I hope the whole sequence will be shown in a respectable forum soon.

From day one of my involvement in this mess, I wrote that we have the best scientists and engineers in the world and in history. Many of these great people are in NASA and its Contractors. But that does not mean that we are immune from making mistakes, even blunders. Oh, he called us stupid. No. If I say that X made a mistake, I don't mean X is stupid. Stupidity kicks in when we don't learn from our mistakes.

Tim writes that I discovered a massive blunder in the initial 1972 design of the Space Shuttle, that I discovered, and corrected, the same mistake in another space system in 1970. He gives details and explanations. I am prepared to answer questions, preferably technical, and I'd rather do it spontaneously online than prepare lengthy postings like this one. I printed this CollectSpace thread and I looked for specific technical questions to answer, but I didn't find any until I reached about page 20, where "garymilgrom" asked a question worth answering. But first, let me clear other issues.

Instead of giving a representative synopsis of the technical issues, Bob applauds the free book advertisement of Hansen and McDonald on this thread. Their summary, he writes, is "spot on." I know who is McDonald, I don't know Hansen, Ph.D. is he an engineer, sociologist or historian? Hansen and McDonald write about a stale issue, the rollout and sharp left turn to Pad 39B. Pearlman missed it in Tim's Chapter and Hansen and McDonald should read the Chapter before they publish their book. The rollout advocates, writes Tim, "led themselves up the garden path," and he explains why. I mention this because McDonald is involved by proxy in bringing the silly rollout about if only because he, and others, did not correctly analyze the loads in the struts of Challenger and previous missions, which you can find tabulated on page 53 of the Report Commission Report. You have read Hansen's post and I wish if someone reads Tim's rollout "garden path" explanation and see the connection that he or she will post the explanation on this thread. Otherwise, I will gladly do it in a future post myself.

Here is the perceptive question by garymilgrom, "Does anyone have knowledge of changes in the Shuttles' liftoff procedure?" He then astutely relates the question to von Braun's "90% lift-off thrust requirement." My answer also goes to valid points raised by Bob and others, and I think it appropriate to address it.

Let me elaborate a little. The 90% liftoff requirement is in the massive 1972 JSC 07700 (for those who don't know it, 07700 is THE Shuttle Spec). The 90% came from pre-Shuttle days. Specs evolve in time. Not this one. As I searched the record, I discovered that the 90% requirement appeared suddenly on the scene, without research, analyses, debates, papers, pros and cons, etc. While I concluded the 90% liftoff requirement is von Braun's, it could have been someone else, but under his supervision. In his book, Space Frontier (Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971, p. 29), von Braun does not show the "dynamic overshoot" effect in his thrust-time diagrams. Nor is the effect spelled out in his and others' papers, articles, books, specs, etc. My speculation here is that the Apollo 90% requirement addressed the devastating "dynamic overshoot" effect — unknowingly! And the Apollo-to-Shuttle technical transition was not done right. And this goes to the heart of garymilgrom's question.

I was involved in the Shuttle troubles from the outside (with Comsat) in 1978. I, as other space experts, left the space program because there was no vehicle then. NASA dealt with the problems, and instead of launching in 78, STS-1 took off in 81. In the media, the problem was tiles. On the inside, liftoff timing was a problem. In 1982, many experts wrote about the change of liftoff time. A primary reference on this is R. E. Gatto of Rockwell International (RI) who wrote in a technical paper ("Effects of System Interactions on Space Shuttle Loads and Dynamics," International Council of Aeronautical Sciences Congress Proceedings, Seatle, WA, August 1982, pp. 376-383) about 5 options considered to delay liftoff time:

1. "Lift-off with a lower thrust level on the SSME's

2. "Lift-off with one engine out

3. Tilt the vehicle on the launch pad

4. Devise a controlled release for the base restraints

5. Introduce a time delay for SRB ignition and vehicles release"

Gatto (RI) commented on the 5 Options as follows, "A study of these options showed that most of them were either ineffective, unfeasible, or introduced undesired risks. Option 5 proved to be both effective and easy to implement." The above happened before STS-1. As garymilgrom correctly remembers, "every launch as waiting for the engines to reach full thrust and then releasing the vehicle." From here on, Gary is onboard, and I hope everyone will catch up quickly.

I said the Apollo-to-Shuttle engineering transition was not right. Every bit of evidence I had convinced me that the 90% requirement was there to avoid the "dynamic overshoot." Let's use numbers. The SSMEs produce about 1.1 million lbs (MP) at lift-off. If we stay fixed on the pad, the stack rocks forward — and overshoots, just like a slinky. Everyone has seen the "tip deflection" of the external tank on NASA Select, let's say about 32 inches. Put a washer on a slinky and release it suddenly, you can see and measure the overshoot. The force in the spring is nearly double what it would be if the washer was lowered slowly by hand. Imagine a horizontal g-field and you release the slinky — now the deflection orientation is horizontal like the ET tip-deflection. The 1.1 MP force from the SSMEs punches the structure (the springs) with the equivalent of 1.9 MP. How do we know that? Most of us should be able to calculate it (including Hansen and McDonald) and NASA and RI actually measured it on the Shuttle (see Tim's Chapter 10).

Here is the problem. The "experts" told me that the 90% thrust was always "engine performance verification" (EPV) requirement. I said it was "dynamic overshoot" requirement. What do you think (after the above explanation)?

Look at the 5 lift-off options above. Imagine 5 experts in a conference room discussing it and you are sitting as an observer. Expert 2 does not even care about "engine performance verification." He says, let's fire up 2 engines fully, wait for the stack to spring back, fire the holddown posts — and then fire up the third engine. Expert 2 is not even concerned about EPV, he is concerned about riding high on the overshoot curve (look up one of my write-ups or your dynamics textbook). The same is true of Expert 1. He says let's lift off with "a lower thrust level." How low? How about like Expert 2's idea? The thrust of two out of three engines is about 67%. Expert 1 is then saying, let's take the three engines to 67%, wait till the stack springs back, release the holddown posts, throttle up to 100, or 104%. Then, what's "the 90% engine performance verification?" Study the 5 Options carefully. You can see that Experts 1 and 2 are, what I call, Apollo-mentality folks, 3 and 5 are Shuttle-mentality EPV folks, I don't know about 4.

I hope you will agree that this kind of discussion is what is needed to bring about resolution to the vexing issues that still simmer after so many years.

Another "extraordinary" point brought up in Tim's Chapter is how engineers mix up pressure and force in the start up of the SSMEs and SRBs. A slim 100-lb lady steps suddenly on an old bathroom weight scale — from zero height. On an ideal scale, the scale registers 100% overshoot. The lady will see the pointer reach 200 lb, though momentarily. NASA wrote that they control the SSMEs' pressure to within 2%. The "pressure" is the equivalent of the lady's 100-lb weight, so the weight of the lady is controlled between 98 and 102 lb. Bob seems to have missed the point in Tim's chapter, "the pressure does not overshoot, the force (or thrust) does!" Bob would have done great service to Hansen and McDonald with this single observation. Hansen grumbles, "AbuTaha's second failure scenario turned out to be much tougher." Hansen and McDonald should have been immediately referred to Tim's Chapter. If my technical reports have been too difficult for them, Tim gives it in plain English. McDonald shows the traces of "26 SRM Thrust-Time Traces During Ignition," (McDonald, A., "Design Evolution of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motors," 21st AIAA/SAE/ASME/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, July 1985, pp. 496-507, Figure 16). The traces are correct if the ordinate is marked "pressure," e.g., psi. But McDonald's ordinate is distinctly marked "thrust," or force. If he were truly measuring "force," he would have captured the "dynamic overshoot," as Tim described how the Marshall engineers captured the "thrust" or "force" overshoot for the SSME's, which was not captured in "pressure" traces.

Pearlman includes 8-lines from a long sentence from an AIAA's reviewer about my paper which, like Hansen, dismiss my work as "junk science," and Bob says Furniss missed the point of the (brilliant?) reviewer when he writes, "Furniss seems to have missed the AIAA reviewer's warning about being misled." It seems that garymilgrom read Tim's chapter, and I wonder if he noticed the AIAA reviewer's last sentence, which Bob skipped, "The delay for SRM ignition did reduce the liftoff loads as stated but did not effect the pre-liftoff design loads." The delay... did not effect the pre-liftoff design loads? Furniss' next words were, "The war was on." The delay did not take the liftoff load from 90% to 100%; for the SSMEs, the delay took the effect of the liftoff loads on the structures from 90% to 172% - exceeding all safety margins for the Shuttle. Bob does not mention that distinguished space experts edited my paper, and I will add that one of the editors was the Chairman of the Dynamics Committee of the AIAA itself. Oh, Tim researched a lot of material over this issue. I think Bob just does not want you to see it. Maybe Gary can provide an opinion now that he sees the liftoff procedure story outlined above.

I knew a couple of the Commissioners, I spoke with a few of them and I knew of all of them. They are honorable citizens who worked hard to serve our Country. I don't believe the investigation began with the motto, "let's cover it up." The Rogers Commission was served badly. Mr. Pearlman, Mr. Oberg, and everyone else, you have my challenge above. Find the crew cabin in the record. And don't complain that you don't have the time, resources, equipment or sponsors. I didn't have any. At least you have considerable input from Tim's Challenger Chapter and from me.

There is much more I want to say about most of the comments on this thread, but I think that I have overextended my welcome. If ever invited to answer questions, I hope those would be succinct and to the point, and I'll try to do the same. Thank you.

Ali F. AbuTaha

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posted 06-29-2007 08:16 PM               

I have, of course, been aware of the on-going discussions by several here regarding the book and whether it includes the mention of theories introduced by Mr. Abutaha. However, not owning a copy myself, I decided to leave it to others to debate and decide.

That was until June 27, when Mr. Furniss forwarded an e-mail to me that he had sent to Praxis' publisher Clive Horwood and his associates. The letter dismissed this thread as a "ridiculous chatroom debate" but that was not of great consequence to me. What was a concern however, was that prior to Mr. Furniss raising my name or collectSPACE, I had not been in direct contact with anyone at Springer-Praxis, let alone Mr. Horwood. As such, I felt compelled to provide a proper introduction to our site and my role as part of it, and wrote Mr. Horwood directly.

I share all this as an explanation for what follows, as Mr. Horwood then put me in touch with Dr. John Mason, who serves as Chief Science Subject Advisory Editor for Springer-Praxis' Space Exploration series. I explained to Dr. Mason that while I did not expect Springer-Praxis to take any responsibility for Mr. Furniss' new e-book, I was concerned, based upon what I had read, but primarily due to the e-mail sent by Mr. Furniss to Springer-Praxis, that Mr. Furniss might try to leverage his relationship with Springer-Praxis in regards to the e-book and controversial theories endorsed within. Dr. Mason in turn shared that I was not alone in my concern and that other collectSPACE readers had contacted him as well, that he was aware of this thread and that he did not believe that Springer-Praxis had provided a platform for the views put forth by Mr. Furniss' e-book. Dr. Mason then expressed his own concern about the comments made here about the Praxis Manned Spaceflight Log, which I agreed to address by obtaining a copy and reviewing its own STS-51L entry. After doing so, I sent the following e-mail to Dr. Mason:

quote:

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I obtained a copy of the "Praxis Manned Spaceflight Log, 1961-2006" and have read the section concerning STS-51L and the loss of Challenger (pages 341-344). Unfortunately, I now must agree with what some of our readers have suggested: that the entry introduces unproven theories that can only be attributed to Ali Abutaha.

On page 342, the following is written: "As the SSMEs built up to full thrust as usual, the Shuttle "stack" thrusted forward laterally, only to be "twanged" back at SRB ignition. This manoeuvre places an excessive load on the lower attach rings of each booster where they are linked to the external tank. In the case of 51-L, the excessive loads caused a small rupture in the casing of the right-hand SRB, which immediately caused a sideways spurt of flame that could not be spotted within the intense brilliance of the main SRB exhaust at lift-off."

This excerpt is based solely on the theories of Abutaha. Per NASA, the Rogers Commission and other independent studies, the "excessive loads" cited do not exist, nor did the "sideways spurt of flame" occur as a result of such loads. This excerpt clearly uses Abutaha's interpretation of photographs he claims to have obtained and a theory he has developed for the accident, which he refers to as "dynamic overshoot". The account given here does not reflect the findings of the Rogers Commission nor the accepted reasons for the accident as published by NASA.

The entry continues: "Mission specialist Judy Resnik immediately noticed the temperature of the liquid hydrogen being fed from the external tank to the SSMEs was high. Commander Dick Scobee tried to look sideways and backwards out of his window to see if he could spot the reason why... Scobee and Smith realised that there was a serious problem and called up the pressure reading on the right-hand SRB."

Again, this is directly attributable to Abutaha's unproven claims and even worse, is based on pure conjecture. There is absolutely no way to know in what direction Scobee was looking and based solely on the transcript, there is absolutely no indication that the crew knew anything was wrong with their vehicle. In the first sign of trouble, the crew (which had access to even less data than the ground) was trained to alert Mission Control as a first course of action. No such "Houston, we have a problem" calls were made. The "pressure reading" that is cited, another of Abutaha's theories, was instead a routine airspeed callout.

If any of this is in question, you only need to look further in the entry, where a backhanded acknowledgment alludes to the fact that what has just been presented as accepted truth is instead in total disagreement with the official findings: "NASA said the crew was totally unaware that anything was wrong, a conclusion reached by the Rogers commission which investigated the accident and, despite a mountain of evidence, decided that the only cause of the accident was failed O-rings, damaged by low temperatures before launch. Analyses of the accident by several engineers were refuted by NASA, though many suggestions were later incorporated quietly into the programme..."

Thus, the chapter does indeed suggest a conspiracy and cover-up. "Several engineers" is in fact just one: Ali Abutaha and his suggestions were not later incorporated, though he likes to claim that they were. His theories were refuted by NASA and by other organizations (including peer review journals) because they were wrong.

Even if Praxis was of the mindset to allow such unverified research to be included, which you have categorically stated you would not, I feel confident that you would agree that for such alternate theories to be introduced as the prevailing cause, that they should be clearly labeled as such and specifically attributed to their author(s). As a book of this nature does not seek to argue alternate theories as to the history of manned space flight, Abutaha's claims as included seem inappropriate for such a publication.

I have not yet posted my own impressions of the Log's chapter to our site, and instead have chosen to contact you first. I would appreciate if you would provide a reply that I may share with our readers, many of whom are Springer-Praxis customers and readers. Thank you.

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quote:

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Reading between the lines I can see now what you are driving at. From what some of your correspondents had said, I had been expecting something far more obvious and transparent - something that actually quoted Ali Abutaha by name and used the words "cover-up" and "conspiracy".

Looking at the examples you have provided, it certainly appears that some of the statements made do relate to the unproven theories of Ali Abutaha without saying so. We had been assured by the authors that nothing of this nature had been included, but there seems little doubt that certain unsubstantiated views are summarised in this section, although perhaps (deliberately) in a rather "watered-down" form.

In my personal opinion, in a book seeking to briefly summarise the history of manned spaceflight, the inclusion of Abutaha's claims here is inappropriate. However, if the authors had wished to include such alternate views, then the correct procedure would have been to clearly attribute these to the individual(s) concerned AND to point out that these views do not reflect the findings of the Rogers Commission nor the accepted reasons for the accident as published by NASA.

There is little that we can do at this stage except to say that if the "Praxis Manned Spaceflight Log" is reprinted, we shall certainly amend the offending section on pages 342-344. It is a great pity that in a book totalling 830 pages, these three pages have caused such a problem, and have lead to the other 827 pages being largely overlooked.

Of all the numerous books in our Space Exploration programme that we have published over the years, this is the only instance I am aware of where such views have appeared in print without it being made quite plain to the reader the source and nature of those claims. We always strive to maintain the highest editorial standards, and we shall do our very best to make sure this doesn't happen again.

I would also like to point out that the "Praxis Manned Spaceflight Log" is the only book we have ever published where Tim Furniss has had any influence on the content, and then only as one of three co-authors.

Finally, I must emphasise that it is certainly NOT Praxis editorial policy to give credence to cover-up or conspiracy theories or to provide a platform for them.

I would like to thank you again for bringing this matter to our attention and for taking the time and trouble to explain precisely the nature of the problem as you see it.

You may extract as much or as little of the email above for your readers and add any comments that you wish to them.

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posted 06-30-2007 12:38 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Spoon:
If a reader wished to investigate further on their own behest and reach conclusions which are not generally accepted de facto, then that is their right. It should not be presented to them initially as truth.

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I agree with your point above. I will only add, and this will be my last post, that you shouldn't use the past tense in the quote above. "If a reader wished (...)". A reader must because no books (or any source of information for that matter) represent the truth (maybe it should be) or the ultimate reference tool. There are no such things. Maybe in a second edition to their Log, Springer-Praxis will correct this (along with numerous omissions regarding astronauts who have flown several missions for example). It's simply a log- and no one should abide by it as the Ultimate Truth and Reference Book (like the three monotheist religions do-- ).

posted 06-30-2007 03:43 AM               

I think the major problem for Ali AbuTaha and Tim Furniss is that we can all watch the video for ourselves, examine the NASA evidence and mke conclusions. What we don't seem to be able to do is examine Ali AbuTaha's. Does no one else have the photos he does? Can no one post them somewhere so we can draw valid conclusions rather than trying to settle this argument with only bits of the evidence for the prosecution? Would it be fair to say that there is a commercial reason for not putting the photos into the public domain at this point?

posted 07-02-2007 03:15 PM               

quote:

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This is Ali AbuTaha again (#102)

By now, I have read your postings carefully, navigated collectSpace, and I congratulate you on a professional forum. Forgive me for offending some of you, a natural reaction to attacks. I attribute the present situation to meager hard evidence about my work in your hand.

Organizers in London invited me in 1982 to speak at a Middle East Communications Conference and the proceedings (MECOM 83) were published in 1983. In my talk, I outlined the technical architecture (perhaps the first) to integrate the, then, stand-alone computer and stand-alone TV set and stand-alone telephone. From the 500 gathered experts, the first question, reminded me of some skeptical posts here, was, "and how are you going to squeeze a black-and-white picture in a 64kb telephone line?" It would do no good to look him up today and send him a color picture by e-mail through a telephone line. You don't want to appear in that light in 2032 – roughly the time span above.

This thread has transcended its title, the collective jeers, and little cheers. As I read Dwayne, Chris, kyra, Naraht, and Pearlman, I am reminded of Herodotus, Josephus and Pliny. Did they report from the trenches or "ivory towers? We still learn and teach these gems after two thousand years. You have set the standard by which you will be judged. If you are concerned about how you will be judged when Praxis publishes the next "Log," then I am out of here. But if you want to be judged by time, as your posts suggest, then I like to contribute to the effort. Kyra writes about a "permanent historical record," Chris is "infuriated" by attitudes in "social, cultural, educational, professional" studies, Naraht admonishes, "to learn how to adhere to the high standards of scholarship that the historical profession upholds," and so on. You have set a lofty standard, and I like it, actually, I like it very much.

The above expert who ridiculed "squeezing a picture into a telephone line" controlled a massive budget. The Internet is history. You don't have multi-billion dollar budget, but your assets are greater – your intellect. Here are other responses to your comments.

"Then you also need to fully investigate the other side of the story and weigh the two against each other," writes "mjanovic" vs. Tim Furniss. The poor guy did for 20 years. His Challenger chapter contains a lot of evidence, I admit soft evidence but he is writing to a general audience. NASA told him AbuTaha is wrong, and he writes that. But he also says that prominent experts agree with Ali. Bob writes, "Ironically, some of the letters that Furniss chooses to excerpt as supportive of Abutaha read much more like (overly) polite rejection letters rather than endorsements." I know these letters well, Bob. Mr. Pearlman is obviously a busy man and he is influenced by the barrage of attacks on me and my work – and possibly my silence for many years. One of the excerpts in Tim's Chapter is from the top American scientist/engineer today, Dr. Arden Bement, the Director of NSF. Fairness demands that everyone reads it: "I had the opportunity of reading your papers concerning the correct way to handle transient loads in pressure-activated structures and found them to be very enlightening. The errors you point out in calculating transient loads are indeed fundamental." Bob and others say that Furniss should have interviewed the writers of the letters. If you ask my opinion, I think it is unwise. At the time of the letter, 1993, Dr. Bement was a distinguished professor of mechanical engineering and his position today should preclude a zoo approach. What makes sense is that collectSpace, or others including Praxis, study the issues, prepare a 3-5 pages report (double-spaced) and submit it to the NSF or NASA. Oh, let me say to Mr. Pearlman that I had briefed Dr. Bement in person over a beer in Washington DC before his letter. Of all the top experts I discussed the subject with in person across the Country (including NASA), he was the most insightful of the abstruse transient subject. The excerpt from his letter attests that the brightest in our Country do sometimes make it to the top.

From the UK, "fragmeister" writes, "What we don't seem to be able to do is examine Ali AbuTaha's (photo evidence)." I mentioned in my last post that Tim Furniss referenced two of my photos showing the fire striking the Challenger right wing at liftoff (again, Spaceflight, BIS, May 1988, page 195). The British Interplanetary Society (BIS) is the oldest established space group in the world and most respected. On a visit to London many years ago, I was given a tour of the new buildings, and I was humbled to hear that they intended to open a section in their library for my works (not only Challenger). I suggest that "fragmeister," and others, get in their cars, visit BIS in London and get the two original pictures that were used for publication. And, "as a teacher," get pictures of the recovered right wing (these are in the Commission Appendices), put the photos side by side and ask your students to compare the locations of fire and the locations of "burn" damage. Perhaps some of your students may aspire to become great aerospace engineers – we need them.

You heard of the New Smyrna Beach videotape taken by Harold Sehnert of Lima, Ohio, and you can find some of my photos of that tape in Space Flight News, March 1987, No. 15, Key Publishing Ltd, England. And believe me, you can make vital measurements from the photos. Just get the evidence first. You will find the next item relevant and shocking.

The Abort/RTLS modes were mentioned by "kyra," who can study this item and report on it. In 1988, PBS did one-hour special on Return to Flight. In the show, NASA took Judy Woodruff and her crew on a tour of flight simulation and training. Rick Hauck was at the helm, the clear call came, "Discovery, go at (with) throttle up," to which Hauck replied, "Roger, go at (with) throttle up." What happened next was shocking. Hauck, with cameras zooming in, reached to the panels before him, "pushed a button" and then "turned a switch." Everyone's interest was at a peak then. How many people watched that show? Was it only me? I developed close-up pictures of Hauck's actions – he pushed the "Abort" button, and he then turned a switch to the "RTLS" position! Get a layout of the instruments in the crew cabin, which you might have received with a magazine. Follow the above short action slowly and freeze it. Here is the sequence: "Go with throttle up," was followed by "Abort," and then "RTLS," or return to launch site, which Tim Furniss reports in his Challenger chapter. Everyone is shouting foul. Get the tape from PBS and see it for yourself. I had shown the tape and pictures to Tim and others years ago. That explains the source of Tim's information.

I hereby request that Dr. John Mason and Mr. Robert Pearlman obtain the PBS recording and carefully study the 10-seconds segment in the 3,600-seconds TV show. I think Praxis (and collectSpace) can raise legitimate questions with NASA. Was the agency simulating in 1988 AbuTaha's "sequence of events" that he submitted to them in 1986, or did NASA independently develop that sequence, simulated their own studies in 1988, and just overlooked telling us about it? It may unfold that Praxis has not betrayed its professional responsibility to its readers and to history.

Mr. Pearlman writes to Dr. Mason, "the only cause of the accident was failed O-rings, damaged by low temperatures before launch." I like to comment on this in a future post.

To me, the important part of my work is the transient effect studies, which I finished in 1992. Around 2000, I prepared a lengthy report (about 1Mb, 114 pages, 70 figures, tables, Shuttle test sheets, Shuttle report sheets, etc., and 52 mostly technical references), opened a domain (shuttlefactor.com) and made the report available for everyone for free, primarily as an educational tool. I let it run out in 2005. The transient analysis is short (about 3 pages) and is rather advanced mathematically. If the reader has not done transient analysis before, it does not matter. After the short math equations, the subject is simplified. One Section is titled, "I am not A Rocket Scientist. Will I get it?" Another, "Dynamic Overshoot and the "$64,000 Question."

All I can do now is find the report (in Word and Adobe formats) and upload it, say, to Mr. Pearlman. My condition is that the Report be made available to those who ask for it on this forum, and that that will be for the purpose of evaluating, or learning, the subject. Tim Furniss writes about NASA and Rockwell measuring the SSME's overshoot and wondering, what's that? You will see it in their ink in my Report. Although I had many Springer-Praxis books in my 8,000 books library that I lost because of my work on this subject, I had not contacted Praxis before. They should also study my "shuttlefactor" report.

Before closing, let me say this. With hardhat on, cranes, helicopter and ropes, I directed the installation of some large structures. I thought I saw it all. But I was awestruck when I stood before two magnificent human achievements: the Great Pyramid in Egypt and the Space Shuttle at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Nothing that I, or others, say can diminish the greatness of the achievement that the tens of thousands of people at NASA and its Contractors gave us. The dynamics of the Shuttle as it roars and soars up distinguishes it from the Pyramid - a unique achievement.

As I said above, you raised the bar. That is good and bad. It is good because it may bring vital information to many good engineers who will turn it to good and great uses. It is bad because your findings may be hurtful, also to good engineers. I have not been able to inspire myself to click on a space site, including NASA's, for many years. I am glad I clicked on collectSpace.

Thank you again.

Ali AbuTaha

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posted 07-03-2007 04:09 PM               

quote:

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Dwayne writes, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." Absolutely. Tim Furniss writes that I am the only person to find the crew cabin in the video. He even repeats the claim in his Challenger chapter. This is not only extraordinary, it is staggering.

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Am I right in reading that you feel the crew cabin was not properly identifed by NASA in reviewing the footage?

Below is what NASA identified from the footage as being the left wing, main engines, and crew cabin (notations are mine). I can't imagine these being wrong. The wing and crew cabin are the correct size in relationship to each other...plus they LOOK like what they've been ID'd as. I would have trouble coming up with two similar looking parts of the shuttle stack that match in size, shape, and appearance.

posted 07-03-2007 05:12 PM            

Thank you Robert for the forum, and following up on things of this nature.

A very bold move on your part in my opinion.

(You know that I have made a few bold assertions of my own, on different topics, over the years)

And thank you Ali AbuTaha, who I'm certain has better things to do, but took the time to respond.

It is a known fact that many people who are looking at the same thing or event, in this case, will come up with some very different conclusions.

Facts are facts.

Thank you gentlemen.

posted 07-03-2007 05:41 PM               

I am suspcious, rightly or wrongly, about anyone claiming to have discovered something who is then cautious about letting their evidence out into the public domain. If the case is so strong, post the relevant photos on this thread and let us all make up our minds. If not, then perhaps the case for the "conspiracy" is not as strong as its proponents would hope.

In the end, there is a lot of other evidence that is not mentioned in these posts. A search on Google revealed a transcript of the air to ground transmissions up to the point where contact was lost (http://history.nasa.gov/transcript.html). I didn't see any mention of SRB pressures...

posted 07-03-2007 11:24 PM               

I'm wondering if this was in real time as a continuation of the launch simulation on the video. I'm thinking this scene was shown when the were talking about the capabilities of the GPC's (256 K?)and how they could act in real time to an abort situation. This included the new "Bailout" option. That was 18 years ago and I still remember it somewhat

I'll also bring out the various revisions of the Data Processing System Dictionary for these Major Modes as well as the Ascent Checklists.

posted 07-04-2007 10:19 AM               

Most probably, if there was a camera in the cockpit, the shot was set up specifically for the camera. And naturally for a program on the return to flight the producers of the program would want to see an abort initiated at the time of the last transmission from Challenger... so that's what they did. If I were in the cockpit shooting that sequence that is precisely what I would ask them to do... and they'd be glad to do it.

The clip is far from "relevant and shocking."

Claims such as relying on one shot from a PBS show ("proof" of what, I'm not sure) completely removes any credibility from the other claims, especially without producing any evidence.

posted 07-05-2007 02:14 PM               

quote:

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AbuTaha (#103)

To corroborate the extensive material in Mr. Tim Furniss' Challenger Chapter, Tim needed a Test Pilot and a Senior Aerospace Engineer, and he got both of them in one, Mr. Scott Todd. Todd seems to think that he mopped the floor with Tim — not so fast Scott.

A test pilot, Todd must be familiar with IMPRP, or IPRT. What? IMPRP, "Integrated High Payoff Rocket Technology Propulsion Program," a three 5-year phases program by the Air Force/NASA/Industry to DOUBLE thrust (I don't know how to overemphasize "double." Maybe I should use color). And how on earth can anyone double the thrust of engines, turbines, motors and other pressure-activated systems? Didn't NASA, Lockheed Martin (now) and everyone under the sun ridicule me in writing and proved me wrong with lengthy engineering analyses by top notch teams (in Colorado, Alabama, Washington DC, etc.) for proposing to "cheat" nature in the early 1990's? Read Tim's chapter.

Some details were revealed in the proceedings of the Moon to Mars Commission, headed by Secretary Pete Aldridge. This is not history; you saw it on television a couple years ago. Get the transcript of the hearings and read about it.

How do you double thrust? I had shown that the nearly doubled loads of the dynamic overshoot hit the Shuttle hard on every mission. Wow! Can the effect be turned into use? Tim wrote about this in Flight, "Pulsing engines could boost Shuttle loads," September 1992. As Tim reported, I intended to "clamp" and "rectify" FORCE pulses to double the thrust, just as has been done with the "voltage doublers" in electronics many years ago. Anyone who took an introductory electronics course should know about "clamping" and "rectifying" a signal.

Wright-Patterson (WP) told MtM that "The first phase we have demonstrated significant improvement in specific impulse, thrust capability and not only solid rocket motors," writes Tim in his chapter. Did Todd read that, and more, in Tim's chapter?

Furniss excerpts from a letter I sent to the Honorable Pete Aldridge during the MtM proceedings as follows, "I am the first and sole inventor of the propulsion process, which I called in the early 1990's "Pulsing Thrust." There are more than 1,000 communications on record with DOD, (Wright-Patterson, Edwards, Space Command, and others), NASA (HQ, JSC, MSFC, Lewis...), the Congress, academia and the aerospace industry and communities." Read my words very carefully, Mr. Todd, and read the words of the WP experts carefully, as found in Tim's chapter, "We have not gotten to TWO (my capitals) times yet but that is a lofty goal and challenging one." BTW, is the IMPRP, IPRT, or my pulsing thrust, in the "Logs" today?

The dynamic overshoot mathematics was difficult. Let me tell you the "Pulsing Thrust" was a mathematical symphony and ballet in one.

Has anyone on this thread read about, or seen on TV or in the sky mysterious trails, in the form of "puffs" — a clear signature of pulsing-thrust? Did you read about the incredible performance of mysterious crafts? Does Scott know about it? Had he flown any of these, or will he? Well, if you do, Scott, you will be operating my invention. Do it well.

I tried to get in on the first of the 5-year phases. I did that because I was the ground floor. The issue went up to Administrator Goldin and even to General Horner, as I recollect. The IG's at DOD, NASA, DOJ, USPTO, the FBI, GAO and other responsible offices should investigate the "Dynamic Overshoot" and "Pulsing Thrust" short history — only 20 years history. Who did what, where, when, how and why? Were laws broken? Was I kicked out of my own invention because some individuals (unknown to all of us) are above the law? And who owns my invention, that Tim reported on 15 years ago? Our Country is great, but it is not perfect. For goodness sake, Plato couldn't get a perfect state in words, and he settled for the Republic. This thread is beginning to show the true greatness of our Nation.

Todd thinks we don't know how to deal with numbers. He writes about the 1.1MP SSME's thrust; we know that. He then ridicules Tim (and me and everyone) writing, "the SRB's light, which only provide an additional 6.6 MILLION pounds of thrust." This goes beyond arithmetic. Dwayne should add this to interesting items that he likes or wants to do. Each SRB produces 2.7MP, for two SRB's, that is 5.4MP (ask McDonald). Add 5.4 and 1.1, we get 6.5MP. But Todd is saying 6.6MP! Is this addition mistake, or is Scott telling us something bigger, far bigger than arithmetic? The WP expert told the MtM of "significant improvement" made with IMPRP (pulsing-thrust?) and "not only solid rocket motors." Mr. Todd, are you saying that the SRBs' tested capabilities today is 6.6MP for two boosters, or 3.3MP per SRB; a 22% improvement? This beats the 18% improvement that was promised with the ASRMs and we never got it after great effort and expense.

We don't only like and respect test pilots, Scott; we honor them (including you) for their service and dedication. Scobee and Smith were more than test pilots; they earned their wings to fly an important Space Shuttle mission. Mr. Todd the gentleman owes Mr. Furniss an apology. I hope it shows up in this thread. And let me say, this whole affair came suddenly and unexpectedly on me. I'm doing my best to keep up, while doing other things. I read and reviewed Tim's chapter for accuracy. I don't agree with the cover-up, conspiracy and other angles, but he is a journalist and I wouldn't be presumptuous to tell a journalist how to dramatize his or her write-ups.

Lastly, I, myself, want to apologize to Mr. Rick Hauck for revealing the Abort/RTLS sequence in my post #102. My hand was forced, and I will say more about this later.

Ali

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posted 07-05-2007 09:23 PM               

An example of its use is well documented. On STS-51F Gordon Fullerton initaited an Abort to Orbit due to SSME failure at request of MCC-H.

In order to validate the claim that an abort was initiated on STS-51L prior to the explosion by Dick Scobee, two pieces of evidence would need to be found:

1. Telemetry data showing a change in the computer mode from nominal ascent(OPS-1) to abort (OPS-6). This occurs when the abort button is pressed, or manually when OPS-6, a Major Mode (MM) is activated with a Commond: OPS 6XX PRO on the adjacent keypad.
   
2. The controls of recovered panel F6 is shown to have been placed in an abort mode (RTLS). This would only show an abort had been initiated, but not when.

Its been a fun journey through this material, but the video, I'm afraid, proves nothing about 51L. Unless either of the two points of evidence can be demonstrated in some way by either physical evidence or multiple eyewitness accounts of those that recovered the crew cabin or worked in MCC that day, then this supposition of an abort on 51L will be an "urban legend".

posted 07-05-2007 09:28 PM               

I won’t discuss this any further in this forum but if you get some spare time, Google ‘pulse jet’ or ‘buzz bomb’ or V-1. To quote Mr. Day, “Publish in a peer-reviewed journal and I'll take this seriously”

posted 07-06-2007 11:32 AM               

quote:

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AbuTaha (#104)

Fantastic, "mjanovec." This is the most valuable post so far as it steers the discussion in the right direction. In my present circumstances, this may be the best thing to happen. The other photos in the Commission Report, pp. 34-35, are also relevant to my comments below. That's exactly my point, the piece marked "Crew Cabin" in the photo is not the Crew Cabin.

The Orbiter is constructed in modules, which are then assembled together. Two pieces are at issue here: (1) The Crew Cabin (CC) and (2) The Lower Forward Fuselage (LFF) section. The relative shape, size and location of the two pieces can be seen in (and scanned from) the Commission, Vol. IV, p. 76. Other engineering drawings or sketches and photos can be found in space publications, perhaps, even in collectSpace files.

Look carefully at the piece marked the "Crew Cabin" — this is NASA's CC. Look at it (and the other photos) from different angles. Do you see that the piece is shallow and that it is curved on the right and left sides? This is the shape of the LFF! The CC is generally "truncated" in shape. It is built separately and then lowered and installed inside the LFF. By "truncated" I mean globular or rounded in shape. January 28, 1986 was a sunny day in Florida. Notice that a truncated body does not case shadows inside itself! Can you make out shadows in the photo posted by mjanovec? It is not very clear or decisive, but a good start.

The decisive evidence comes from the video, which NASA released in normal and slo-mo. There one can follow the LFF as it tumbles and see the "shadow" as it enters and traverses the piece. A truncated body, like the CC, casts a shadow on the same side all the time, especially as it tumbles. Try it with a round object in front of a light. Also, everyone can make a simple model of the LFF from drawings or photos. Just cut and bend a paper or cardboard, like a flying-paper-plane. As the piece (in the NASA video) tumbles, hold the paper model of the Fuselage section at the correct angle and compare the two.

The piece identified by NASA as the CC, and posted by mjanovec is not the Crew Cabin, and, specifically, it is the Lower Forward Fuselage. The CC's shape is distinct and it has windows, and any evidence by anyone, including me, must match the geometry of its drawings and sketches or stand-alone pictures, at different angles.

There is more to the LFF. The Search and Recovery Team (SRT) did the most arduous work in the investigations. The team put their hearts out into that work. They worked in difficult conditions, marked every piece, described it, photographed it, pinpointed its longitude and latitude and much more. Their valuable input ended up collecting dust on shelves. That work deserves recognition. After the above photo study is completed, compare the locations of the pieces at the bottom of the ocean, developed by the SRT. Although the exact location of the Crew Cabin was not released, and I agree with that decision, the CC was not found anywhere near the left wing and the engines. Other useful observations can be drawn from the SRT's work.

In particular, the SRT identified more than 2,000 Orbiter pieces and a total of more than 4,000 pieces (see Commission, Vol. III, Appendix O). Piece #3 (three) listed by the SRT is, "3. R/H Lower Forward Fuselage, X0262 (0004)." The SRT were on top of what everyone thought was the Crew Cabin in no time. For that, they deserve recognition. By the time I got involved in 1986, it was too late. There is more to the LFF issue but I can't remember it now.

Regarding the Crew Cabin, I am prepared to talk about it to respected audiences today. I can quickly find the required video and enhancements. Once recognized, there will be a flood of questions, beyond those I posed in Post #101. I cannot do it in a post here. Also, I wanted for 20 years to have a respectable production of the subject and to invite the families of the Challenger heroes to preview it first, if they liked. Over the years, NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN and others declined to even speak with me about it. I had shown the footage and enhancements to a number of people, and Tim Furniss is the only one to write about it. Perhaps, after some discussions on collectSpace, Mr. Pearlman and others may have valuable suggestions.

Let me conclude with two personal notes. I have not touched my photo and video records since 1987-88. It is not that I can't find things in boxes; I cannot get to them now. Please be patient and I promise to find as much, and as quickly, as I can materials that will satisfy your intellectual and professional curiosity. During 1989-94, I concentrated on the engineering aspects of the "dynamic overshoot" and the "pulsing thrust" invention. "Shuttlfactor" has all the dynamic overshoot material. It is a lengthy report, and I had built the navigation hyperlinks for the sections myself. Even if I put it on my screen this weekend, it'll take time to check out the hyperlinks and compatibility with current systems. I promise to send sample sections to Mr. Pearlman after this weekend. Some Sections are standalone, and some parts may be posted right here. However, "shuttlefactor" does not contain anything on liftoff fire, falling debris, the Crew Cabin or anything related to my "sequence of events" work.

The second personal note is difficult, and I wish it did not have to come out. To "fragmeister" and others, I hear and understand you. There are no games and I have no ulterior motives. Doing the work you are reading about here, I have lost a home, was evicted from two rentals, and the rest of the trip downhill has not been pleasant. I had hoped that two or three posts here would be it. Also, I had a massive congestive heart failure in late 2004, and they tell me I was written off. Great professionals in the Fair Oaks Inova Virginia Hospital managed to get me back. I recovered and had a relapse. Combine this with the previous misfortunes and, hopefully, I'll have your understanding of the situation. I really feel bad writing, let someone do this or that. Please don't broach the subject of this personal note. The subject on hand is fascinating and very useful, and I thank "mjanovec" for pointing it in the right direction.

Ali

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posted 07-09-2007 10:44 AM               

After nearly 20 years, here is a modest effort and hopefully useful information.

The photo at center is the "mjanovec's" post, and another supposedly Crew Cabin photo (same source) is on the right. On the left, four forward Orbiter modules are shown, from top to bottom: (1) Upper Forward Fuselage, (2) Crew Compartment (CC), (3) Forward RCS Module, and (4) Lower Forward Fuselage (LFF). All one needs is good lighting to make out the piece in the photos. It is the LFF without the lower forward lip section. Read my post #104 about the shadows and the order of recovery of the LFF by the Search and Recovery Team. Also, notice the rise, or slant, of the windows in the Upper Forward Fuselage and the CC. The supposed "CC" in the photos below, and video, does not show the slope or the windows at any angle!

The piece in these and similar photos is the Lower Forward Fuselage, NOT the Crew Cabin.

The Crew Cabin broke off the Lower Forward Fuselage. How, why and when did that happen? My questions about the CC in Post #101 will slowly make sense. In December 1986, I met with Shuttle directors at NASA HQ; the meeting was headed and observed by two great space veterans, respectively, Mike Weeks, then head of the Shuttle program, and Burt Edelson, then Associate Administrator for Science. The 2-hours meeting fell apart, and neither NASA nor I mentioned it then. Many issues were contested, as normally happens amongst engineers. I wrapped up my presentation before we got to the critical Crew Cabin subject.

One of the things I wanted to know around that time was the mode of failure in the LFF to CC connections: What failed in tension, compression, shear, bending, torsion, fatigue, etc., and in what direction? That was vital to determine what happened to the Crew Cabin and to match it with the video evidence. Did the CC detach from the LFF before or after the LOX explosion? Did the Crew take action? What? The wreckage was buried a month later. Of course, I could, and did, use reverse engineering to determine what happened to the CC from the elements of the trajectory that the Crew Cabin experienced, and as observed in the video.

For now, it is important to begin by realizing that the piece in the above photos is not the Crew Cabin. Do I hear seconds?

posted 07-09-2007 10:52 AM               

Thank you Hawaii, "Rizz." One of my projects in the beautiful State in 1975 or 76 helped me to find the Challenger fire at lift-off. A contractor wanted to use polyurethane foam, then new and now in every hardware store, in the project. That created a problem, the OSHA requirements. Is the material flammable? I had tested metals, alloys and composites used in spacecraft structures in laboratory environment, but this was an unusual test. We arranged for sheets of aluminum to be sprayed with the foam (ET?), invited the OSHA inspector, and had the welders go at it with vengeance. I had the welders scorch the foam from many angles while I inspected things carefully. Polyurethane is not flammable, but talk about black smoke! I did the test next to the antenna that overlooks beautiful Sunset Beach. Suddenly, there was a commotion. Apparently, the folks on Sunset Beach called the Fire Department about a possible fire in the Comsat Earth Station on the north shore. Things calmed down quickly, but I did not forget the distinct black smoke clouds. There were angles where I knew there was intense fire, but all I could see was the bellowing dark smoke!

While trying to resolve the serious liftoff loads issue in 1986, I began to study the film record carefully. I was primarily looking for evidence to support my "dynamic overshoot" findings. The Hawaii experience was useful. The brightness of the day, intensity of plumes and white colors saturated the cameras. By simply filtering the glow effect, the intense fire became vividly visible. I took pictures of these. The BIS photos mentioned before are shown here.

I don't have the exact NASA camera Id for these views now, but this camera was behind the assembly. As the Challenger moved up and slightly forward, the black smoke wrapped around the right booster, as seen on the far right. The fire is clearly visible below the outer tip of the right wing and a small flame made it through the hinge line of the elevons. Notice the bright spot in the shadow of the wing in the left photo. This is also fire. I did geometric model analysis to eliminate the possibility of reflection from any source, including, sunlight, plumes, etc. Also, the motionless fire in the photos can be clearly seen undulating and surging in video. There is no peer-review for this kind of thing. As Feynman said, all one needs are eyes.

NASA did photo enhancements and CAD analysis to construct thermal footprints of the fire in flight and generated black-and-white contours (with shades of gray) of the fire at T+58.716, T+59.0441, T+59.516 and T+60.866 seconds (see Figs. 138 and 139, Commission, Vol. III, N-83). You see the thermal contours of the lift-off fire that I captured in the two photos on the right. On the upper left corner of the top photo, you see the edge of the right wing and below it the intense fire leak – black hottest and green is cold. As the stack moves up, (2nd picture), you see the wind effect washing the fire down. There are many other pictures of the lift-off fire, and I hope that the photos here will convince many, if not all. Still, the video is more convincing. Some of you may want to go further. Get your Shuttle model or pictures, get oriented with the geometry involved, and study the locations of the fire, the right booster and the stricken joint with other input.

I was severely criticized by many. I forged the fire, they said and wrote! How do you do that? I know fire when I see it. When I was a small boy, I caused great damage to our home playing with matches next to a first-aid cabinet that had lot of cotton, alcohol bottle and medicines that went up in flames and burned many things before antiquated fire equipment arrived and battled the results of my foolishness then.

There is another picture that I like to post here. To "fragmeister," here is a photo of the recovered right wing of Challenger (a NASA release). Look at the exact locations of the fire in the first two photos and compare with the burned-out parts of the wing.

I was mesmerized by the detailed evidence of the Titanic, nearly a century after that tragedy. I thought about it a lot from different perspectives. Challenger touched all of us. I hope you will think about the evidence before you.

posted 07-09-2007 10:55 AM               

Reading the excerpts, that Mr. Pearlman included in his letter to Dr. Mason, from "Praxis Manned Spaceflight Log, 1961-2006," I am compelled to agree with both gentlemen that some entries are indeed inappropriate for the Logs. Also, please note that I did not write nor review nor edit those entries, and that I would not have approved the inclusion of some of them. To put things in perspective, let me briefly outline my study of the Challenger accident. The study consists of four parts, in order of importance:

1. The O-rings, joint rotation and the design of the joint did not cause the accident — engineering analysis and reports (1986-87).
   
2. The excessive transient forces, which were completely neglected since the initial design of the Space Shuttle, are the most likely cause of the accident — engineering analysis and reports (1986-92).
   
3. The "sequence of events" that I developed from lift-off to, and beyond, the explosion is completely different from the accepted sequence — definite photographic, and related, evidence (1986-87).
   
4. Interpretation of the Transcript — speculative study based on the above three definite studies and extensive personal professional experience (1986-87).

posted 07-09-2007 11:30 AM               

The only way to analyze visuals like this is with a control, and match up many normal launches from the same angle with this footage to see whether this is out of the norm. If you had the ID of the camera, this would be a simple thing to do. (The Rogers commission went through this very same excercise)...

For me, it seems you leap to any conclusion you believe supports your own position (such as the "relevant and shocking" footage from the PBS show, which indicates nothing) rather than applying logic in looking at specifically what the evidence shows. Without a control, the visuals you present are not persuasive.

posted 07-10-2007 02:11 AM            

I didn’t want to get off topic but I did want to make a point that I thought was relevant.

So here it is, again, slightly edited.

It pertained to STS 107, and a few ‘still frames’ of her as she passed over the Hawaiian Islands, days before her fatal re-entry.

An optical tracking station here in Hawaii acquired what some believed to be ‘significant data’, (of anomalies to the leading edge of the wing) while others who reviewed it stated that it was ‘not resolved enough’ to be conclusive. So nothing was done. The details are now irrelevant.

The point that I wanted to get across was simply that many people could view the same event (or in this case, an image) and come up with a completely different conclusion.

There are people that review this sort of stuff for a living, and know exactly what they are looking at and there are people who don't really know what they are looking at. No disrespect intended.

Further more, some of those conclusions (with regards to any event) can be reached, or based on ‘other factors’ or ‘agendas’ which I won’t venture to get into. Many of you will catch my drift.

In the end, we are all human, and we all make mistakes.

People have different ideas or theories, and they should be given equal time, no matter how absurd you may think their claim is. Generally, they are just seeking the truth by putting ‘facts’ together.

It’s easy to call someone a crack pot or a conspiracy theorist. Quite often, the masses prevail, like lemmings on a leap of faith so to speak.

Some say extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, I think Carl Segan coined that phrase. It is certainly healthy and normal skepticism, but sometimes the answer is quite simple, and it’s right in front of your eyes.

You can look at it, but you just can’t see it.

I am not saying that is the case here, but it is something to ponder.

How many people in history have made extraordinary claims with their 'theories'?

Galileo & Copernicus quickly come to mind.

In closing, a quote from Schopenhauer:

“All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."

Go figure...

I look forward to more information.

Aloha,

posted 07-10-2007 07:54 AM               

If anyone is interested, I found that Mr. AbuTaha's old website is still available on the internet, via www.archive.org. His shuttlefactor paper is readible at the following URL: http://web.archive.org/web/20011205095050/www.shuttlefactor.com/homepage.html

posted 07-10-2007 01:00 PM               

quote:

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Although I am not an engineer, I have studied and written about the history of engineering for approaching 30 years. At Auburn University, I also teach a course on the history of technological failure. My conclusions about Abu Taha's theories conform exactly with what I have learned from my interviews with a significant number of people involved with the Shuttle program and Challenger accident, including Rogers Commission members Neil Armstrong and Don Kutyna and Allan McDonald, former Director of the Space Shuttle SRM Project for Morton Thiokol, with whom I have collaborated on a forthcoming book about the Challenger accident and its aftermath.

Abu Taha's interpretation of the leak at launch is hardly a new revelation. As the McDonald memoir will emphasize, the SRB joint leaked from 0.638 to 2.5 seconds during liftoff because of an O-ring leak, not because the case was broken by an excessive pre-launch load. There is no evidence of a leak again until T+59 seconds and within one second a fully developed plume is seen coming from the joint area of the right-hand SRB. Within 14 seconds the motor pressure drops 20 psia and the ET explodes. There is no way the SRM could be leaking near 6000º gas from a broken case for the previous 59 seconds (as Abu Taha claims) without any drop in pressure, without developing any observable plume, or not causing a major structural failure to the SRM or burning through the ET during that time frame.

In spite of Abu Taha's long-held claims that the O-rings were not the cause of the accident and that the Rogers Commission got it wrong, everyone I have spoken to about this matter believes emphatically that Abu Taha is the one who is badly mistaken. The launch and flight films, the SRM chamber pressure data, the recovered hardware, the post accident sub-scale and full-scale testing with joints at low temperatures and with flawed O-rings all support the conclusions of the Rogers Commission.

As a historian of science and technology, I fully understand that the "right" answer sometimes comes from a solitary breakthrough or minority opinion and that there are many, many pressures for conformity in society. But in this case, I feel strongly that Abu Taha simply has it wrong.

McDonald is the man to believe: a real "rocket scientist;" former Director of the Space Shuttle SRM Project for Morton Thiokol; a person who was there in the Launch Control Center on the day Challenger launched; who knows how SRMs operate; and who was in charge of fixing the problem after the accident. Though McDonald's book will reveal a huge amount of information never before revealed to the public, the data he presents in his memoir on the accident basically agrees with the conclusions of the Rogers Commission. They did get it right.

Dr. James R. Hansen

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