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  Jerry Woodfill, LM C&W system engineer

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Author Topic:   Jerry Woodfill, LM C&W system engineer
Paul78zephyr
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Posts: 740
From: Hudson, MA
Registered: Jul 2005

posted 04-02-2007 12:25 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Paul78zephyr     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Can any comment on this information?
I would agree that hundreds (in fact tens of thousands) of those who worked on Apollo had more intimate knowledge of various systems than I had or have. However, none (to my knowledge) have spent more than three decades reconstructing and examining the workings of the engineering, designs, and circumstances that dealt with the rescue of Jim Lovell. My efforts have specifically focused on the spiritual perspective, i.e., God's hand of providence and His answers to world-wide prayer. Additionally, as the systems' manager for the alarm system, my expertise focused on how various components worked together to avoid just the kind of disaster which nearly killed the Apollo 13 crew. In this sense, my research has been unique and qualifies me as an "expert."
I'd never heard of Mr. Woodfill before. The religious parts I leave to each individual to ponder — I am asking about the technical parts. I have never seen this before in any other Apollo 13 reference — or at least not laid out in this manner.

Robert Pearlman
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posted 04-02-2007 01:35 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Robert Pearlman   Click Here to Email Robert Pearlman     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Here's what Sy Liebergot wrote in December 2006 to a similar question on sci.space.history:
Jerry Woodfill was a "wannabe" engineer during Apollo 13 that worked on the Apollo CM Caution & Warning System. To hear him tell it, he was central to dealing with the problem — he's been milking his non-involvement in Apollo 13 for years.

Sy Liebergot
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From: Pearland, Texas USA
Registered: May 2003

posted 04-02-2007 04:20 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Sy Liebergot   Click Here to Email Sy Liebergot     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Thank you, Robert.

Buel
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From: UK
Registered: Mar 2012

posted 05-05-2017 03:00 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Buel   Click Here to Email Buel     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
A "wannabe engineer" or not, Chief of the Test Division and the Mission Evaluation Room, Don Arabian, certainly thought highly of Jerry's work.

Personally, in all my interactions with Jerry, he has always made it clear that he was a "mere MER minion." I guess an example of this would be here where he states on page 89:

As a MER-minion, I was never involved or central to the main events which rescued Apollo 13. Though I was the MER engineer for the Apollo 13 warning systems, my role was only as an expert. Should an inexplicable glitch in an alarm occur, I might be consulted.

Mike_The_First
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Registered: Jun 2014

posted 05-10-2017 05:40 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Mike_The_First   Click Here to Email Mike_The_First     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Mr. Woodfill is certainly not publicity shy.

That said, I've read his website, I've read what Sy had to say, I've read what other people have had to say...

And with all of that, I can't figure out what he did or didn't do in 1969 and 1970. Even the above letter, with a few proper nouns changed, could have been sent to anyone from the custodian who cleaned the bathrooms to Deke Slayton and applied equally well. (It would not surprise me in the least if that was a form letter, but that's a different discussion.)

There's obviously a place in history for back-room engineers; Jack Garman proved that. So, with that, I ask: what exactly did (or, in the case of Sy's comments, didn't) Jerry Woodfill do in 1969 and 1970?

Buel
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From: UK
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posted 05-10-2017 11:48 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Buel   Click Here to Email Buel     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
You're aware of the Mission Evaluation Room? I think Jerry explains quite clearly that he was a Spacecraft Warning System Engineer? He also explains that he did not play a major role during Apollo?

Tell me what exactly it is that you want to know?

Mike_The_First
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Posts: 436
From: USA
Registered: Jun 2014

posted 05-10-2017 03:46 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Mike_The_First   Click Here to Email Mike_The_First     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
quote:
Originally posted by Buel:
You're aware of the Mission Evaluation Room?
Yes.
quote:
I think Jerry explains quite clearly that he was a Spacecraft Warning System Engineer?
No, he says it. He doesn't explain anything, like what that job entailed. When people like Sy and John Aaron say they were an EECOM during the Apollo era, we know what that means because people have discussed the job and responsibilities at length and it can be found in several books and all over the Internet.

When I Google "Apollo Spacecraft Warning System Engineer" all I find are people talking about Jerry Woodfill without discussing what he actually did.

There's a difference between knowing someone's job title and knowing what that person did. I mentioned Jack Garman earlier — he's a great example. I don't know his job title, but I know what role he played. One of those two things is more significant than the other.

If you can look at "Spacecraft Warning System Engineer" and know, with no questions, what roles and responsibilities that person had, you're smarter than I am.

quote:
He also explains that he did not play a major role during Apollo?
That's extremely debatable. I found an article that credits him and Ed Smiley by name (only — nobody else's name was mentioned) with the design of the device that saved the Apollo 13 crew. The writer had to get that idea from somewhere.

I have no idea if he over-claimed, as I don't know what he even did. But in all the various interviews I've found with him, I can't find him ever once saying "You know, I didn't actually do much and I'm going to be talking a lot more about what I saw than what I did." It's that lack of disclaiming that plants ideas like the writer above came away with.

quote:
Tell me what exactly it is that you want to know?
What I asked. "[W]hat exactly did (or, in the case of Sy's comments, didn't) Jerry Woodfill do in 1969 and 1970?"

I like learning about the various job roles and the individuals who held them. Just repeating their job title doesn't tell me what anyone did in exact terms, and, in this case, doesn't even tell me what he did in vague terms.

For example, did he design it, build it, or maintain it? What do any of those actually entail in this context? What was his role in Apollo 13? Was he on the "Tiger Team" for the CO2 situation?

The very next sentence in the excerpt you posted above says "And I was — when the carbon dioxide levels began to threaten the astronauts’ lives, ringing alarms."

What exactly does that mean? What was he asked about? What did he have to say on the matter he was asked about? Who was it that asked him about the matter he was asked about?

Or, to sum up all these questions: What did he do?

Buel
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Posts: 811
From: UK
Registered: Mar 2012

posted 01-03-2019 05:24 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Buel   Click Here to Email Buel     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
It's been a long time coming but I have just come across this that describes Mr Woodfill's role in the Mission Evaluation Room as well as you could ask for (as you did). It is an internal memo from Jerry's manager in the Apollo General Instrumentation Branch to another group in MSC who attempted to transfer Jerry to another branch:
LM Operational Instrumentation Impact
With the Loss of Jared R. Woodfill
September 24, 1968
  1. As the result of the manner in which I have assigned the various tasks within the subsystem, Mr. Woodfill is the Caution and Warning expert within the subsystem (within the Center, actually). In order for me to keep abreast of the subsystem problems and activities as a whole and the transducer problems in particular, I have been quite divorced from C and W activities and have, therefore, relied very heavily upon Mr. Woodfill in this area. He has been the subsystem C and W representative in all meetings with Morris, General Bolender, Mr. Low and GAEC.

    Since ASPO Systems Engineering would not help us in resolving the multitude (15 or more) of interface problems between CWEA and other subsystems, we have been forced to carry the ball in this area. I emphasize term “caution and warning” as opposed to CWEA, for we are working with the C and W system as opposed to just a black box.

    Knowledge of the C&W cannot be acquired in a matter of weeks. It would severely handicap the subsystem to not only lose the expert, but to have to spend effort in training a replacement. The required knowledge can only be gained through many months of experience with the C and W system. Besides, Mr. Woodfill would take with him specific knowledge that he has gained in handling past problems. This information would never be available to a replacement.

    Since Mr. O’Brien has not been involved in the C and W system, there would not be a particular advantage in letting him be the replacement. This would create the requirement to train two people – Mr. O’Brien and his SCEA, DSEA, and TE replacement.

  2. The CWEA interfaces with almost all of the LM subsystems (EPS, ECS, G and N, AGS, RCS, Propulsion, Radar, Comm., and Display and Controls). All CWEA inputs are time critical in the operation of the spacecraft. That was the principle criteria in determining which parameters were to be routed into the CWEA.

  3. There is no one at GAEC that is working on the C and W system on a full time basis. One GAEC engineer is responsible for the CWEA box, and the GAEC instrumentation subsystem manager and assistant subsystem manager work on the C and W system problems only on a “fire-fighting” basis. It seems that they do not know much more about the C and W system than I do. It was the lack of C and W system engineering at GAEC in the first phases of the LM program that has caused the interface problems that have popped up in the past few months.
Further to this, Jerry helped me out with the following:
I was responsible for the warning system hardware on both the Command Module and Lunar Module (the Command Module's Caution Detection Unit –CDU- and the lander's Caution and Warning Electronics Assembly -CWEA) by default I became the ex-officio Caution and Warning Subsystem Manager. While I never received that title or corresponding financial benefit, the role was altogether crucial to the success of Apollo and safety of the crew. Additionally, it thrust me into the midst of all things Apollo: management reviews, failure analysis, mission analysis, visits by flight controllers, Apollo astronauts, and personal phone calls from program managers. Suddenly, I was in demand to head Caution and Warning reviews with the prime contractor and NASA subsystem managers to redesign and correct flaws in the alarm systems.

Though not an official subsystem manager, my assumed responsibility exceeded that of the other subsystem managers in that I had that duty for both the North American Command Module and Grumman Lunar Module. All other subsystem managers only were responsible for their subsystems for either the CSM or the LM, not both vehicles. I had both in my ex-officio capacity. This was fortuitous by virtue of being able to correct deficiencies found in either spacecraft’s warning system benefitting its counterpart in the sister spacecraft.

While most SSMs' monitoring of their systems focused mostly on their vehicle’s crucial mission phase, because I had both vehicles’ alarm systems, my responsibility was throughout the entire mission to the Moon,

  1. launch and ferry to the Moon in the CSM as well as
  2. lunar descent, stay and ascent in the Lunar Module, and
  3. lastly, the CSM’s return to Earth, entry and landing.
And throughout the entire mission, numerous nuisance alarms sounded in both vehicles at all mission phases. To this end, I had to be familiar with the design and idiosyncrasies of all Apollo spacecraft systems.

Fortunately, our spacecraft subsystem managers and project engineers for electrical power, instrumentation, and communication were in the same NASA MSC unit, the Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division (IESD) housed in a single building on the MSC campus. This encouraged collaboration between the vehicle engineering experts for both the CSM and LM in our division. The rescue of Apollo 13 greatly benefitted from this situation with regard to charging the depleted CSM entry batteries from the large Lunar Module Descent batteries. The SSMs for both vehicles worked out the life-saving jumper charge procedure in the Mission Evaluation Room in Building 45. Here is a picture of this crucial effort in April of 1970 at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas.

At the far right corner is Art Campos who innovated the procedure to charge the depleted CSM entry batteries using the large batteries in the Lunar Module’s descent stage. Art was the Subsystem Manager for the Lunar Module’s Electrical Power System. Others included in the picture are the CSM Subsystem Manger for the CSM electrical power system.

Art and I spent many hours dealing with the interface between the Lander’s electrical power system and the caution and warning system. Because we were in adjacent offices in Building 15 of the MSC, this was possible. I specifically remember how challenging was creating the matrix below of all the permutations and combinations of characteristics of the suit fan caution and warning light and master alarm. I was able to have this information entered into the Apollo Operations Handbook and in turn into the crew check list instructions for moon missions. This picture shows Art, the Lunar Module Electrical Power System Subsystem Manager, seated behind me in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) in Building 45 adjacent to the Mission Control Center (MCC) in Building 30.

I genuinely hope this helps with your query of "what did he do?"

Finally, I think it would be remiss of me not to add that Jerry, whatever you may think of his willingness to court publicity (remember John Llewellyn's saying "If it's true, it ain't boasting") or his religious beliefs (both of which are irrelevant to what his role constituted), he certainly was not what one could describe as a "wannabe engineer."

Buel
Member

Posts: 811
From: UK
Registered: Mar 2012

posted 06-14-2020 04:44 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Buel   Click Here to Email Buel     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Like him or not, this unique character today celebrates 55 years being employed by NASA.

Not a bad effort for a "wannabe engineer."

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