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Author
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Topic: Apollo 13: Culpability of management
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Paul78zephyr
Member Posts: 678
From: Hudson, MA
Registered: Jul 2005
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posted 02-22-2007 09:58 PM
  
After the Challenger disaster, NASA was criticized and scrutinized for more than the technical issues that caused the accident, but in particular the management issues that contributed to the decision making process that ultimately doomed that spacecraft. With respect to Apollo 13 and O2 tank no. 2, we all have read about the 28VDC switches and the 65VDC power, the mechanical damage from the two-inch drop, the post CDDT de-tanking by heating the tank. All technical issues. But my question is one of management oversight. Why was management — even James Lovell himself — so willing to sign off on a tank so "out of bounds" of its normal operation? I've read many accounts that it took days to de-tank O2 tank no. 2 after the CDDT. If I put something in a tank and then cannot get it out, and have to force it out, then there is something wrong very with that tank and I should not use it. My gosh, they were sending the thing to the moon. NASA could not afford a new tank? Where were the management red flags? Was poor management discussed at the post accident review? From all I've read about the entire incident I've always felt that it was a lot like Challenger from a decision making standpoint. Please comment. |
garymilgrom
Member Posts: 1966
From: Atlanta, GA
Registered: Feb 2007
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posted 02-27-2007 07:31 AM
I'm not sure the accidents were due to the same causes. Challenger seemed at least partly due to management's desire to meet an impossible launch schedule — there was real pressure to launch that cold day. But Apollo 13 should have had no pressure at all — they had landed on the moon twice by then, meeting Kennedy's goal and beating the Russians. I think you need to look at the technical procedures that allowed this damaged tank to be signed off. It seems there was some lack of oversight there. But that seems like a genuine technical problem — X is broken but procedure Y will fix it — rather than poor management — X is broken but we're going to launch anyway. |
FFrench
Member Posts: 3165
From: San Diego
Registered: Feb 2002
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posted 02-27-2007 01:22 PM
quote:
Originally posted by garymilgrom:
But Apollo 13 should have had no pressure at all — they had landed on the moon twice by then, meeting Kennedy's goal and beating the Russians.
Not sure if I am recalling this absolutely correctly, and how it might fit into this larger picture... but while the flight may have launched after Kennedy's goal was completed, the CSM and accompanying hardware were being built long before that, when it was still not certain whether a landing attempt could be made as early as Apollo 11. I believe the thermostat voltage change happened in 1965, and the tank was dropped in October 1968. |
Paul78zephyr
Member Posts: 678
From: Hudson, MA
Registered: Jul 2005
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posted 03-24-2007 09:52 PM
O2 tank no. 2 was clearly not working right. And if the fill/drain tube was malfunctioning wouldn't that make the powers that be say, "Hey, I cant see inside this tank but parts inside are not right — and we don't fully understand why. We don't fly until we know exactly why"? But they did not. |
SpaceAholic
Member Posts: 4494
From: Sierra Vista, Arizona
Registered: Nov 1999
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posted 03-24-2007 11:08 PM
All of the service module H2 and O2 vent/fill couplers/(SPS side) Beech panel connectors as well as much of the command module stuff in my collection were manufactured in the 1965 to 1967 time frame (most show later inspection stamps however). I think given the limited quantity of production, even by Apollo program standards it would have been very costly to have the individual subcontractors sustain a manufacturing base for basically 10 years (if you factor in Skylab and ATSP) to spit out one or two parts. (There were no CNC machines back then!) |
CLEAN
New Member Posts: 1
From: Arlington, TX, USA
Registered: Mar 2007
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posted 03-25-2007 12:04 AM
It was determined that the problem the tank was exhibiting was only going to be a factor on the ground. Once the thing launched, the tanking/de-tanking problem was moot. Lovell was made aware of the problem, and since they had (to their knowledge) sucessfully de-tanked the thing w/ the heaters, it was decided to launch it as is since that particular problem would not re-occur in flight, and the tank was thought to be otherwise sound.
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Obviousman
Member Posts: 438
From: NSW, Australia
Registered: May 2005
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posted 03-27-2007 05:37 AM
I'm going on memory here, but I think that the problems encountered in the de-tanking procedure were not that uncommon, and the "boiling off" of the O2 was a standard fix.If I recall correctly, the main problem was that the temperature gauge only read to slightly above the normal temperature and there was no visual indication that the tank internal temperature was way above normal limits. So the tank was 'boiled off' as per normal, and there was no indication that internal temperature was abnormal. |
Sy Liebergot
Member Posts: 501
From: Pearland, Texas USA
Registered: May 2003
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posted 03-27-2007 07:15 AM
I would recommend that you re-read the O2 Tank Chonology in Appendix B of my book. |
Paul78zephyr
Member Posts: 678
From: Hudson, MA
Registered: Jul 2005
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posted 03-27-2007 02:07 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Obviousman:
...the "boiling off" of the O2 was a standard fix.
I've never read (and yes, I'm holding a copy of Sy Liebergot's book in my hands right now) anywhere that it was "normal" to have to "boil off" the contents of a flight rated cyrogenic O2 tank. That is what the drain port is for. Just because you can do something doesn't mean you should do it, and certainly does not make it a normal procedure. Even in Liebergot's book, he said they used this procedure to try to get the O2 out of the tank. I think some engineers just got clever here (and probably thought they were heroes for saving NASA from having to delay the mission to yank out that tank). I think it was just accepted that since the O2 would not come out they would force it out (i.e. heating). Just get a bigger hammer. That is just my point. Where was the management to say "...wait, don't get a bigger hammer, don't be clever, something is wrong and we'll not fly until its right." I really think it's that simple. No one in management wanted to stop the train. Even after two landings, meeting the end of the decade and all that — it was still "go fever." I think perhaps it was a fear that the funding would be cut off before they could fly more flights (which was happening, i.e. Apollo 18 to Apollo 20 cancelled). |
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