posted 10-29-2014 10:37 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by cspg:
Any particular reason why the word "mishap" is used in the thread's title as opposed to failure?

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posted 10-29-2014 10:40 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Hart Sastrowardoyo:
Me, I don't see this as a failure. Yes, the rocket didn't make it into orbit and the payloads weren't delivered.

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posted 10-29-2014 11:01 AM               

Here is another video of the mishap, as taken by Spaceflight Now's Stephen Clark. You can see me fourth from left (and the last to leave the field):

posted 10-29-2014 12:00 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by cspg:
And the Russians launched Progress M-25M< today...

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posted 10-29-2014 03:01 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Robert Pearlman:
Orbital Sciences declared the flight "not successful" in their statement released on Tuesday night.

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posted 10-29-2014 03:30 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Headshot:
...does anyone have an idea of who will foot the bill for the launch pad damage?

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posted 10-29-2014 03:31 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Robert Pearlman:
Here is another video of the mishap, as taken by Spaceflight Now's Stephen Clark.

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posted 10-29-2014 03:56 PM               

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Originally posted by dabolton:
How are your eyes/ears Robert?

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posted 10-29-2014 10:24 PM            

Am with Robert regarding the panic situation there at the viewing site. What's the hurry? Most amusing to see everyone scurrying to the safety of that little tent?

posted 10-29-2014 10:37 PM               

That said, as a matter of course, we had been instructed well before the launch that in the case of an emergency we were to leave our cameras and other equipment behind and proceed directly to the bus. So in that regard I did exactly what I wasn't supposed to do.

posted 10-29-2014 11:21 PM               

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Originally posted by Dave_Johnson:
I got the impression of a hydrogen leak that appears to have ignited during the launch.

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posted 10-29-2014 11:31 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Robert Pearlman:
Not sure I understand your comment about the nanosatellites.

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posted 10-30-2014 06:23 AM               

...is a cursory look; it will take many more weeks to further understand and analyze the full extent of the effects of the event. A number of support buildings in the immediate area have broken windows and imploded doors. A sounding rocket launcher adjacent to the pad, and buildings nearest the pad, suffered the most severe damage.

At Pad 0A the initial assessment showed damage to the transporter erector launcher and lightning suppression rods, as well as debris around the pad.

posted 10-31-2014 10:42 AM               

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Originally posted by stsmithva:
I thought that someone showed rather good presence of mind to say, in the seconds between whatever happened with the rocket and the impact back on the ground, "Hold on, it's gonna be loud. Gonna be loud! GONNA BE LOUD!"

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posted 10-31-2014 01:41 PM               

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Originally posted by mjanovec:
I would also argue that an explosion over water, with the vehicle falling safely into the ocean is probably the "best" type of destruction, since it leaves the pad undamaged. But that was obviously not an option here.

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posted 11-05-2014 08:57 AM               

While still preliminary and subject to change, the current evidence strongly suggests that one of the two AJ-26 main engines that powered Antares' first stage failed about 15 seconds after ignition. At this time, we believe the failure likely originated in, or directly affected the turbopump machinery of this engine, but I want to stress that more analysis will be required to confirm that this finding is correct.

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Orbital will employ the inherent flexibility of our Cygnus cargo spacecraft that permits it to be launched on third-party launch vehicles and to accommodate heavier cargo loads as allowed by more capable launchers. This option had already been contemplated in previous contingency plans and product improvement roadmaps and its implementation should be relatively straightforward.

Second, taking advantage of the spacecraft's flexibility, we will purchase one or two non-Antares launch vehicles for Cygnus flights in 2015 and possibly in early 2016, and combine them with several upgraded Antares rocket launches of additional Cygnus spacecraft in 2016 to deliver all remaining CRS cargo. That is by consolidating the cargo of five previously planned CRS missions into four more capable ones, we believe we can maintain a similar or, perhaps, even a somewhat better delivery schedule than we were on before last week's launch failure, completing all current CRS launch program deliveries by the end of 2016.

Third, we will accelerate the introduction of an Antares upgraded propulsion system, advancing its initial launch date from the previously planned 2017 into 2016. Consequently, we will likely discontinue the use of the AJ-26 rocket engines that had been used on the first five Antares launch vehicles unless and until those engines can be conclusively shown to be flightworthy.

Finally, we will support the work of MARS and NASA to quickly repair the facility damage at Wallops Island so as to allow Antares launch operations to resume there in early to mid-2016 and to continue for the long term.

We will accomplish these actions with no cost increases to NASA under our CRS contract, and with only modest, if any, near-term delays to our space station delivery schedules. In key respects, this plan follows the same upgrade path we were previously pursuing to increase the performance and reliability of Antares and to expand the capacity of Cygnus. Now however, we will be able to make faster progress due to our ability to redirect both manpower and hardware from the original Antares configuration to the new vehicle configuration.

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We are in discussions now with three launch providers; two based in the U.S. and one based in Europe. Indications at this point are favorable that these launch operators do have available capacity that is suitable for Cygnus launches as early as the second quarter of 2015 and extending all the way to mid- to late-2016. There are variations among the operators in terms of their specific schedule availability and the payload performance and pricing of their vehicles.

We plan to work with NASA to determine the most favorable combination for one or two gap filler missions using third party launch vehicles and are aiming to make final decisions on the best way forward over the course of the following month.

posted 11-23-2014 09:30 PM               

This video is a compilation of 4 cameras that were on the launch pad to capture the launch. The video runs through each at full speed before slowing down to give you a slow motion of the explosion. One of the cameras was right in the middle of the fireball, with chunks of broken rocket showering down around it.

posted 04-15-2015 09:25 AM               

Ronald Grabe, president of Orbital ATK's flight systems group, said the investigation concluded there was "excessive bearing wear" in the turbopump of one of the two AJ-26 engines in the Antares stage. That bearing wear causes rotating and stationary parts of the turbopump to come into contact, which in turn caused the failure of the turbopump and the engine itself.

posted 10-29-2015 03:24 PM               

...the IRT determined that the proximate cause of the Antares launch vehicle failure was an explosion within the AJ262 rocket engine installed in the Main Engine 1 position. Specifically, there was an explosion in the E15 Liquid Oxygen (LO2) turbopump, which then damaged the AJ26 rocket engine designated E16 installed in the Main Engine 2 position. The explosion caused the engines to lose thrust, and the launch vehicle fell back to Earth and impacted the ground, resulting in total destruction of the vehicle and its cargo.

The IRT was not able to isolate a single technical root cause for the E15 fire and explosion. The IRT identified three credible technical root causes (TRCs), any one or a combination of which could have resulted in the E15 failure:

• TRC-1: Inadequate design robustness of the AJ26 LO2 HBA and turbine-end bearing for Antares.

  After performing extensive technical design evaluation and a number of sensitivity analyses of the LO2 turbopump, it became apparent to the IRT that the HBA and thrust bearing designs have several intricacies and sensitivities that make it difficult to reliably manage bearing loads. As a result, this area of the turbopump is vulnerable to oxygen fire and failures.

  The AJ26 engines were not subjected to a thorough delta-qualification program to demonstrate their operational capability and margin for use on Antares. Performing a thorough delta-qualification program for Antares would likely have revealed these issues. Furthermore, the Acceptance Test Program (ATP) established for the AJ26 engines was not sufficient to test and screen the engines for these design sensitivities and potential workmanship issues that could exacerbate those sensitivities.

• TRC-2: Foreign Object Debris (FOD) introduction to the E15 LO2 turbopump.

  Forensic investigation identified the presence of both titanium and silica FOD within E15 prior to its impact on the beach. However, no firm conclusions can be drawn with respect to the quantity of FOD introduced to or already present within the engine prior to or at the time of the explosion.

  The lack of significant particle impact damage to the recovered impeller and other components indicates that there were not gross-levels of FOD present within the system. In addition, there is no clear forensic evidence that FOD directly or indirectly led to the E15 failure.

• TRC-3: Manufacturing or other workmanship defect in the E15 LO2 turbopump.

  Forensic investigation performed by Orbital ATK and NASA discovered the presence of a defect on the turbine housing bearing bore that was not consistent with baseline design requirements3. The investigation determined that the defect was introduced during machining of the bearing bore housing and was therefore present prior to the engine ATP and Antares launch for Orb-3. Forensic investigation of Engine E17, which failed during ATP in May 2014, discovered the presence of a similar non-conforming defect in the housing bearing bore.

  A limited number of other engine turbine housings (i.e., Engine E16 and the 1998 test engine) previously and successfully subjected to extended ground tests and ATP, as well as an untested spare turbine housing, were inspected. Neither E16 nor the spare housing showed any evidence of a similar manufacturing defect. However, the 1998 test engine that had been subjected to extensive ground testing exhibited a similar defect to that observed in Engines E15 and E17, but it was not possible to conclude whether the defect was introduced during manufacturing or was the result of wear from extended operation of the engine.

  Sufficient information is not available without further engine inspections and tests to conclude that the presence of this manufacturing defect would always result in failure of the engine during operation.