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Author
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Topic: Advocating for riskier Apollo landing sites
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Buel
Member Posts: 718
From: UK
Registered: Mar 2012
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posted 12-13-2020 04:28 AM
   
I thought I remembered in Gene Kranz' book "Failure is Not An Option" him saying that Harrison Schmitt organised/led a meeting with various colleagues where he pushed the idea of going to other more risky areas with Apollo. However, I thought I recalled that this was in response to Apollo missions 18, 19 and 20 being cancelled. Was this before Apollo 17 or after? |
RobertB
Member Posts: 198
From: Israel
Registered: Nov 2012
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posted 12-13-2020 05:18 AM
In Kranz' book, it's described as being in the period: - After the cancellation of Apollos 18-20
- After Apollo 13
- Before Jan 31st, 1971 (Apollo 14)
Pages 341-2 of 2001 paperback. |
Rick Mulheirn
Member Posts: 4289
From: England
Registered: Feb 2001
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posted 12-13-2020 07:54 AM
Pertaining to Apollo 17, Deke Slayton instructed Gene Cernan to rein Schmitt in. While preparing for Apollo 17, Schmitt was not going through the correct channels — bypassing his commander with suggestions for changes to the mission. I got the impression from Cernan that in his capacity as commander this was a little embarrassing. |
MCroft04
Member Posts: 1684
From: Smithfield, Me, USA
Registered: Mar 2005
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posted 12-13-2020 08:05 AM
Schmitt lobbied to land on the back side of the moon. I asked him about it during a field trip that he led to JSC for the American Association of Petroleum Geologists 2006 annual meeting in Houston. He told me that Chris Kraft came up to him one day and said "Jack, it is not going to happen, so forget about it." That was the end of it. |
Buel
Member Posts: 718
From: UK
Registered: Mar 2012
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posted 12-13-2020 08:10 AM
Succinct as ever!! |
Headshot
Member Posts: 961
From: Vancouver, WA, USA
Registered: Feb 2012
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posted 12-13-2020 01:34 PM
I find it puzzling that Schmitt lobbied so hard for a landing site on the far side of the moon when he could have used his influence (such as it was) to get NASA to select a landing site on Tycho Crater's rim. Tycho was the almost the universal dream for scientists on the landing site selection groups and panels.Tycho also would not have required one or two semi-expensive communication relay satellites. However, as has been stated elsewhere, it was more risky operationally speaking. |
perineau
Member Posts: 295
From: FRANCE
Registered: Jul 2007
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posted 12-13-2020 02:20 PM
Which begs the question: should America have gone ahead with more (and perhaps riskier) missions to the moon or "quit while they were ahead" after six successful landings? |
Mike Dixon
Member Posts: 1495
From: Kew, Victoria, Australia
Registered: May 2003
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posted 12-13-2020 02:43 PM
I think Apollo 13 mission put that idea to rest. |
Robert Pearlman
Editor Posts: 45244
From: Houston, TX
Registered: Nov 1999
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posted 12-13-2020 03:15 PM
From a political, and therefore funding point of view, the Apollo program was only about landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth before the end of the decade. Everything else that came along with and after that was because it was not possible to spin up and then shut down a program of that size with the flick of a switch. quote:
Originally posted by Headshot:
...one or two semi-expensive communication relay satellites.
I think you just answered your own question: Schmitt had to know that there was no interest in spending new money on Apollo. The program was already looking for ways to shave costs internally, by reusing spacecraft hardware and suit components. Proposing a mission that required even a modest increase to NASA's shrinking budget would have either been dead on arrival or threaten other projects already underway at NASA for a dead-end mission. |
RobertB
Member Posts: 198
From: Israel
Registered: Nov 2012
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posted 12-14-2020 02:11 PM
As a nice piece of serendipity, Dr. Schmitt has just published an article which covers this exact subject! I tried to convince NASA management that Apollo 17 should land in the farside basin, Tsiolkovsky. To do this would require adding the capability to communicate with and track spacecraft over the farside. I first suggested a farside landing after the Apollo 13 mission as the culmination of a proposed site selection strategy that would revitalize public and scientific interest in Apollo. That plan consisted of Apollo 14 repeating the Apollo 13 objective to land at Fra Mauro, followed by Apollo 15 landing at Tycho, Apollo 16 landing in the north with access to permanent shadow, Apollo 17 touching down in the Orientale basin, and, finally, taking the then still scheduled Apollo 18 to the farside basin, Tsiolkovsky. Although certainly doable with Apollo-era technology, this post-Apollo 13 plan did not attract much interest in increasingly conservative NASA management circles.Soon after being assigned to Apollo 17, I again suggested that Tsiolkovsky be considered as a landing site, backing up that proposal, with the help of the "Lunar Mafia" (see Chapter 2), with significant preliminary analysis on how to do it. NASA management again found the idea unattractive. Finally, the Director of the Manned Space Craft Center, Chris Kraft, stopped me in the hall of Building 1 one day and told me to forget the idea, and I gave up the effort. Although I often lobbied hard for an idea, particularly those vetted through the "Lunar Mafia", I knew how to follow a direct order to "stop." |
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