posted 02-08-2012 02:19 PM               

Apollo was known for its engineering triumphs, but its success also came from a disciplined management style. This excellent account of one of the most important personalities in early American human spaceflight history describes for the first time how George E. Mueller, the system manager of the human spaceflight program of the 1960s, applied the SPO methodology and other special considerations such as "all-up" testing, resulting in the success of the Apollo Program. Wernher von Braun and others did not readily accept such testing or Mueller's approach to system management, but later acknowledged that without them NASA would not have landed astronauts on the Moon by 1969. While Apollo remained Mueller's priority, from his earliest days at the agency, he promoted a robust post-Apollo Program which resulted in Skylab, the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. As a result of these efforts, Mueller earned the sobriquet: "the father of the space shuttle." Following his success at NASA, Mueller returned to industry. Although he did not play a leading role in human spaceflight again, in 2011 the National Air and Space Museum awarded him their lifetime achievement trophy for his contributions.

Following the contributions of George E. Mueller, in this unique book Arthur L. Slotkin answers such questions as: exactly how did the methods developed for use in the Air Force ballistic missile programs get modified and used in the Apollo Program? How did George E. Mueller, with the help of others, manage the Apollo Program? How did NASA centers, coming from federal agencies with cultures of their own, adapt to the new structured approach imposed from Washington?

George E. Mueller is the ideal central character for this book. He was instrumental in the creation of Apollo extension systems leading to Apollo, the Shuttle, and today's ISS and thus was a pivotal figure in early American human spaceflight history.

• Springer, October 7, 2012
  
• Softcover, 280 p. 20 illus. in color.
  
• ISBN 978-1-4614-3700-0

posted 09-03-2012 12:47 PM               

The book covers Mueller's career at NASA where he made major contributions to Gemini as well as Apollo, then skims over his career after leaving NASA. As the book itself states it's not a biography.

There are many behind the scenes anecdotes and the interaction between top managers Webb, Seamans and Muelller plus their underlings like Shea and Philips are surprising to me for their highly political nature.

One criticism - Mueller is known as a strong advocate of Apollo follow on programs. Early in the book the author makes the point Mueller believed in these but failed to put them in place. However that doesn't stop a great deal of space being devoted to said projects. We read of speeches, budgets and meetings plus moon bases and Mars fuel depots all while knowing these programs went nowhere. While there is value in understanding Mueller thought he was building a capability, not a one-trick pony; the value of devoting so much space to these never-achieved items is debatable to me.

Another area that could be improved is graphics. The management layers and relationships were complex at best and some simple organization charts would go a long way at explaining these.

On the plus side are two strong points. This is the first book that successfully explains for me the difference between the management of a center and the management of the program at that center.

Further I've never realized the distinction between building a product like Apollo for the purchaser (in this case the US nation, through Congress, via top Apollo political management) versus building the product for the user (in this case the astronauts and flight controllers via top Apollo technical management).

posted 09-04-2012 08:30 AM               

I don't have the book in front of me to check the index but that's my recollection. Caveat - after a while I started skimming through the AAP sections as they were so numerous and extensive.

posted 09-04-2012 09:39 AM               

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Originally posted by garymilgrom:
Skylab is never mentioned by name. I don't have the book in front of me to check the index but that's my recollection. Caveat - after a while I started skimming through the AAP sections as they were so numerous and extensive.

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posted 03-09-2013 04:47 PM            

Only factual error I've spotted so far is calling SA-7 a suborbital flight (p.65) It was orbital, placing a boilerplate CSM into orbit (as were all Saturn 1 Block II flights — orbital, that is).

Discussion of AAP I could use more of--it was the crucial follow-on that failed and in doing so doomed further use of the Saturn/Apollo infrastructure, an unrecoverable loss. We'll never see the like of the Saturns again, for sure.

For my (rather jaundiced) take on AAP see my article in the January 2007 issue of Spaceflight magazine: "The Future of Manned Spaceflight: The View From 1966".

posted 03-10-2013 08:07 AM               

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Originally posted by tfrielin:
Only factual error I've spotted so far is calling SA-7 a suborbital flight (p.65) It was orbital, placing a boilerplate CSM into orbit

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