posted 08-21-2011 08:48 PM               

I mean, management, technical staff, cosmonauts, other institutions, insurances?

posted 08-21-2011 10:50 PM               

That mistake was the voltage in the ground support equipment that supplied the power to the contact switch in O2 tank 2 was the wrong voltage, that basically welded it closed on the pad.

And the fact that the whole shelf assembly was dropped about two inches which further damaged the tank.

posted 08-21-2011 11:32 PM               

The satellite was recovered, by hand, by two spacewalking crewmembers later in the mission. I believe the investigation following revealed several flaws in the training for the tasks, but I haven't read it in a long time.

posted 08-22-2011 10:53 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Fezman92:
Personally, I think that the Challenger and Columbia disasters were the fault of politics and the desires of the contractors to not put their companies in bad light.

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Kind of a broad statement, don't you think? And how would you consider Challenger to be a contractor bit when it was Thiokol that was telling NASA NOT to launch? Granted they did knuckle under and a VP did sign the waiver, but in that case, NASA's launch criteria flipped 180 from what it should be. Normally on a review, the contractor says the equipment is ready and NASA says "prove it". But this ONE time you had the contractor saying the equipment was NOT ready, NASA again said "prove it".

posted 08-22-2011 11:13 AM               

Vladimir Komorov's Soyuz 1 flight had the stuck solar panel, but he still managed to reenter. The chute didn't come out fully though and the capsule slammed into the ground at a fatal speed. Cause of the chute problem was a result of when insulation was sprayed on the descent module. The covers for the parachutes were not installed at the time, so the insulation was applied over the openings in the descent module for the chutes. This insulation restricted the size of the cavity where the parachutes would be packed, so the chutes were packed too tight. What could have been much worse though is if the solar array problem hadn't cropped up and Soyuz 2's launch hadn't been scrubbed from the planned docking and EVA transfer, both Soyuz 1 and 2 would have crashed because 2 had the same chute problem. So it would have been four dead cosmonauts, not just one.

Soyuz 11's depressurization and death of the Salyut 1 crew was ultimately caused by a check ball in the pressure relief valve not being torqued at the right specification. So when the explosive bolts seperating the orbital module and descent module from one another fired, the shock moved the ball and the air leaked out of the valve. Compounding the problem is even if the crew HAD been able to close the valve, there was no spare tank of oxygen in the descent module to re-pressurize after any pressure loss and oxygen lost due to the leak. What is worse about the whole thing is when investigators tested the torque on the valves used on previous Soyuz craft (and some ready for flight). They found that NONE of the valves were torqued to the right specifications (some were torqued more than others, but none were torqued right). So it was a failure that was considered almost inevitable.

posted 08-22-2011 12:51 PM               

The ones that come off the top of my head are Friendship 7 landing bag, Aurora 7 multiple failures, GT-8 thruster short circuit, GT-9 AMU spacewalk, Apollo 1 fire, Apollo 10 LM switch incorrectly configured, Apollo 11 1201 and 1202, Apollo 12 lightning strikes, Apollo 13 #5 F1 shutdown and Beech's failure to upgrade 28v to 65v O2 tank thermostat, Apollo 14 LM panel short, Apollo 15 landing parachute, Apollo 16 SPS issues, Skylab losing solar panels and ASTP CM switch improperly configured allowing dumped fuel fumes to enter crew cabin.

I'm not as familiar with the shuttle mission problems as most of you. Aside from the obvious Challenger and Columbia failures due to mismanagement, incompetence and arrogance, the fact that the SRBs had nine burn throughs of the O-Rings previous to 51-L, would have to qualify that for the list.

I think we can all agree that Linda Ham and her team were responsible for Columbia's loss and the reason why no action was taken to save the crew and orbiter. The foam impact had been a problem from the first flight, but Linda took arrogance and incompetence to a new level, directly leading to the loss of Columbia.

Wasn't there a Mars satellite mission where the US and UK contingent of scientists used different math, but nobody talked to compare notes, so when the mission flew, it apparently crashed into Mars.

Let's not forget about the FUBAR situation with Hubble's mirror being ground to the wrong specs. The company responsible for grinding and polishing the mirror was a top secret facility, due to their work for DOD, NRO and NSA, but nobody from NASA or Hubble's team was allowed in the facility to make sure everything was being done properly. Oops.

posted 08-22-2011 01:34 PM               

The CAIB found (source: Wikipedia that:

Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage was detected. This affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude.

Ultimately the NASA Mission Management Team felt there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the strike was an unsafe situation, so they declared the debris strike a "turnaround" issue (not of highest importance) and denied the requests for the Department of Defense images.

The ET is safe to fly with no new concerns (and no added risk) of further foam strikes, justification that was revisited while Columbia was still in orbit and Chair of the Mission Management Team (MMT) Linda Ham re-assessed, stating that the "Rationale was lousy then and still is". Ham as well as Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore had both been present at the October 31, 2002 meeting where this decision to continue with launches was made.

Managers are the ones responsible for setting the tone in the organization and practicing what they preach. Ham was one of several managers in a position to take the concerns of the engineers and run them to ground, but because she did not agree with the assessment, those concerns were dismissed and terrible consequences resulted.

posted 08-22-2011 02:16 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by 328KF:
During an attempt to retrieve it, K. Chawla tipped the Spartan into a spin which rendered an RMS grapple impossible. The satellite was recovered, by hand, by two spacewalking crewmembers later in the mission.

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The satellite was equipped wih a mounted pin whose purpose was to assist in a manned servicing. Yet the tools to grapple said pin were not invented until after the decision to repair it due to the failure of its General Electric Attitude Control System.

The Trunion Pin Attachment Device (T-PAD) used by Astronaut Nelson failed to capture the satellite. He attempted to hit the pin several times with increasing force. This caused the satellite to begin tumbling.

Nelson did the best he could to stabilize the satelite manually, but that only made the problem worse. By the time the EVA ended, power was draining due to the gyrations resulting in the solar panels not receiving optimal solar illumination.

Goddard controllers were able to eventually stabilize the spacecraft. The remote manipulator arm was then used to capture the satallite.

I later heard it was revealed that, after examining pre-flight images of Solar Max, the root cause of the trouble was the unfortunate placement of a rivet near the base of the pin. The T-PAD was designed to receive the pin whose length was known. However, the rivet interfered with the pin causing it to not be fully inserted into the T-PAD, and so the capture mechanism was never triggered by the impact of the pin's end on the trigger.

posted 08-22-2011 02:57 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Fra Mauro:
Many things happened over the years leading to that tragic flight. Blaming just a few people isn't right.

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However, the foremost issue I have with Linda Ham and her team is they used the wrong algorithms and computer programs in making their determination to prove that Columbia didn't suffer any impact damage. Linda was so sure her team had proven there was no possible way that Columbia suffered any damage, it allowed her to be insultingly arrogant to everyone who offered help.

What's really insulting is there were multiple ways to put eyes on the spacecraft, but Linda refused all offers... why? It was only discovered after the crash that Linda and her team screwed up big time, but even then she didn't admit fault for her teams errors and extremely poor decisions.

The USAF, DOD, NRO, NSA, JPL, the Hubble people and the Russians offered to retask satellites in hopes of checking out any damage to Columbia, but Linda refused their help, allowing her arrogance to rule the day. The USAF offered their airborne telescope, that would have easily seen any RCC damage, but Linda refused their help. Why?

My biggest issue with Linda and her team was their refusal to bring Columbia home using a low heat/low stress re-entry profile. The same re-entry program was used for Atlantis in 2000, when a foam impact was thought to have caused tile damage. Why didn't Linda and her team use a tried and true method of bringing Columbia home by starting their re-entry interface over Australia with an 1,800 degree max temp, instead of a standard re-entry with a 3,000+ temp?

There was no doubt of a major foam impact on the RCC leading edge, so why not take every precaution to protect Columbia and the crew, instead of acting as if they knew everything was fine? Didn't we all see the chunk of material come off of the leading edge of Columbia's wing two days into the mission? We were told it was ice, when in fact it was most likely RCC material floating away. Again, two days into the mission everyone knew the orbiter was shedding material from the exact site where the foam impacted the leading edge, so why not use every asset available to make an accurate assessment?

There is no doubt if Linda had allowed assets in place to help her make an accurate diagnosis of the situation, many steps could have been taken to save Columbia. I remember reading where it would have taken 1 spacewalk to remove tiles from non-critical areas of Columbia to fill the hole of the leading edge. Obviously that's a last ditch and extreme effort that may not have worked, but at least it was better than allowing seven of our best and brightest people die.

posted 08-22-2011 03:00 PM               

Douglas built the shroud to be attached to the NASA Agena second stage, but the Air Force decided late in the process that the ADTA and Atlas could make orbit without needing a NASA Agena. So now the ATDA and fairing would be installed directly onto the Atlas by a McDonnell crew instead of the normal Lockheed crew, who would have attached it to the Agena.

NASA contracted Douglas to witness, inspect and sign off on the shroud installation but, over NASA objections, McDonnell refused to permit a Douglas engineer on the gantry, saying that the installation was simple and they did not need any help. Not understanding the purpose of the electrical connector quick disconnect lanyards, they taped them under the small fairings that protected the explosive bolts. These prevented the shroud from deploying.

posted 08-23-2011 03:27 AM               

The big thing to keep in mind about the whole incident is there were several engineers that kept saying Columbia would survive since the debris strike wasn't bad. Indeed, previous data collected on foam strikes to the tiles (notice I said "tiles" not RCC) revealed that they survived without much damage. The infamous "Crater" program predicted the results of a foam strike to tiles with a pretty good degree of accuracy.

Columbia however got a hole punched into its wing by a foam strike to RCC. There was no collected data to support what the results would be of such a foam strike as it had never really happened before. Atlantis had a smaller hole punched into one of its panels and it survived (I've read it was a tile behind an RCC panel that got dislodged as opposed to the RCC itself though). Indeed nobody knew what the results would be until the fired a block of foam into the RCC panels at the Southwest Research Institute a few months into the Columbia investigation. The Crater program had no parameters for an RCC strike, so it couldn't say what the results were. Wayne Hale had it right in one of his blogs in terms of a saying that should be in the office of EVERY engineer, "You are NOT as smart as you think you are."

As such, many of those voices who believed Columbia had no critical damage were convinced it was a strike on tile, not on RCC and they drowned out the voices for inspection. As for the agencies who could have helped, I have not read ANYTHING that said the Russians or the Hubble crew offered to shoot photos of Columbia or that any requests were made to those groups. Hubble is designed to hit distant targets and take long exposures, not shoot quick passes of a shuttle (not to mention aiming on a target in a lower orbit likely would have resulted in a lot of light pollution to the image from the Earth, assuming the orbits were such to allow such photos to be taken. Only the Air Force and the NRO had the assets that likely could have figured out what was going on if they had been brought into play (short of dumping an EVA astronaut over the side to have a look).

posted 08-23-2011 09:44 AM            

In the end though, as I think I heard Jerry Ross say at one point "One thing is clear: we didn't do enough." That much is true.

posted 08-23-2011 01:58 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Fra Mauro:
Ham and company played a role but they were not the only ones who had some responsibility.

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Bottom line, Linda refused to listen to anyone's opposing opinion, she refused every offer to help determine the extent of the damage and it was her decisions that killed the crew.

NASA managers above her didn't want to appear as if they didn't have confidence in Linda or her team. So they presented a united front, they deferred to what they thought was her teams superior knowledge of the situation and it cost this country it's best and brightest people.

When you have engineers begging the mission management to image the impact area one day into the mission, the question still has to be asked why Linda didn't do anything to help the 107 crew.

The low stress re-entry profile was suggested as a possiblity during one of the NASA press conferences about two-thirds through the mission. I didn't know such a re-entry profile was possible, but after the NASA managers said it was used for Atlantis in 2000, it was another option. Apparently it wasn't, but it's obvious the standard re-entry profile didn't work out too well for them, did it?

In my opinion, you allow the commander of the spacecraft to make the decision if he/she wants to risk a spacewalk to determine the condition of their vehicle. If Linda had allowed the USAF to image the bottom of Columbia, the impact hole would have been clearly seen. At that point multiple courses of action would have been taken, instead of blocking every possible way to save the crew.

posted 08-23-2011 02:00 PM               

1. Russian rescue was likely impossible. STS-107's orbit was in a 39-degree inclination. Soyuz launches into a minimum 51-degree inclination orbit (45.6 degrees if they don't mind dropping boosters onto China).

2. An EVA would have been interesting to say the least. The airlock was connected by tunnel to the SPACEHAB module. Would the spacewalkers have gone out of the side door, or was there a hatch at the top of the tunnel? I suppose there had to be some way to get into the cargo bay in case the payload bay doors would not open or close.

posted 08-23-2011 02:53 PM               

I guarantee you the Chinese would have been happy to allow the Russians to drop a booster onto their soil, if there was a chance to save 107. Linda Ham wouldn't even allow the USAF to help, so I'm sure she wouldn't think of asking a foreign nation to help save our astronauts.

posted 08-23-2011 03:44 PM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Spacepsycho:
The Russians have that capability and could have done something to help.

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posted 08-23-2011 08:23 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by wickball:
Does anyone know what Linda Ham is doing these days? Does she talk about any regrets?

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posted 08-23-2011 08:37 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by brianjbradley:
Linda Ham currently serves as Constellation Program Transition Manager at NASA.

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posted 08-23-2011 08:43 PM            

Indeed the falling foam is the accepted theory of what happened that fateful Saturday morning but there are unanswered questions.

To take the controversy in a different direction; the static "foam projectile cannon" tests at the facility in San Antonio were NOT conclusive beyond a shadow of a doubt. Indeed, they may have gotten considerably different results if they had used two moving objects? Moving, as in the speed of the shuttle at that point in liftoff when the bit of foam came loose from the ET and quickly disintegrated upon orbiter impact.

posted 08-23-2011 10:49 PM               

Most recently, this government body has taken to blaming flight crews and their "lack of professionalism" for several high-profile accidents without any serious insight to the organization which hires, trains and qualifies them for duty.

It is natural thing for people to help understand and cope with such a disaster if they have a person to blame. One person who, it is believed, should have done something different or made different decisions. With that bias of hindsight it is easy to see, starting from the adverse event and working your way backward, how the dots all connect back to that one action or decision.

Unfortunately, that person, in this case Ham, had no way of knowing at the time what that outcome (adverse event) would be. Unfortunately for her, she was the one most directly responsible for those decisions and therefore most exposed in the CAIB report.

Certainly, in this rather unique case where there was ample time and opportunity to take action while none was taken contributed to the shock and anger immediately following the accident. Even to me, it is still somewhat difficult to imagine decisions like this being made with very little notification to the CDR and even less input solicited from him.

To the casual reader, it would seem that the CAIB itself identified Ham among various other managers as "culprits", but in reality the report when taken as a whole identifies many failures of the entire organization. NASA was happy to take the layman's interpretation of the CAIB report to demote and reassign those identified. Sorry, but even the current responsibilities Ham holds is nothing like direct oversight of an operational spaceflight. The organization had clearly moved her out of the "life and death" decision making chain.

posted 08-24-2011 02:59 AM            

quote:

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Originally posted by Cozmosis22:
Indeed, they may have gotten considerably different results if they had used two moving objects?

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You have to give the investigation team some credit. I'm sure they did the math(s).

posted 08-24-2011 10:15 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Robert Pearlman:
...it may be that her title has since changed (she is however, still employed at NASA).

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posted 08-24-2011 10:39 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by wickball:
Does she talk about any regrets?

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posted 08-25-2011 06:52 AM            

The first formal Debris Assessment Team meeting was held on January 21, five days into the mission. It ended with the highest-ranking NASA engineer on the team agreeing to bring the teamʼs request for imaging of the wing on-orbit, which would provide better information on which to base their analysis, to the Johnson Space Center Engineering Management Directorate, with the expectation the request would go forward to Space Shuttle Program managers. Debris Assessment Team members subsequently learned that these managers declined to image Columbia.

Without on-orbit pictures of Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team was restricted to using a mathematical modeling tool called Crater to assess damage, although it had not been designed with this type of impact in mind. Team members concluded over the next six days that some localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry, but they could not definitively state that structural damage would result. On January 24, the Debris Assessment Team made a presentation of these results to the Mission Evaluation Room, whose manager gave a verbal summary (with no data) of that presentation to the Mission Management Team the same day. The Mission Management Team declared the debris strike a "turnaround" issue and did not pursue a request for imagery.

posted 08-26-2011 11:41 PM               

Only thing one might fault the crew on (and it is a bit of a stretch) is for not shutting down the thrusters after docking with the Agena to see if that was the culprit before assuming the Agena was at fault. But they were briefed on what to do if the Agena "went wild" as there were concerns about it before the flight and they assumed that was the case, so that is why they undocked and found out the problem was not with the Agena. So if they had shut down the thrusters after shutting down the Agena, then they might have detected the problem earlier. But at the same time the thrusters were likely in the checklist to remain active in case an emergency back away maneuver was needed.