The Statement of Work accompanied a purchase request for $27 million, dated January 5, 1962, for 15 Titan launch vehicles. Pending ratification of the Gemini Operational and Management Plan, however, funding was limited to $3 million. To oversee this work, SSD established a Gemini Launch Vehicle Directorate, headed by Colonel Richard C. Dineen, on January 11. Initial budgeting and planning were completed by the end of March, and a final Statement of Work was issued May 14; although amended, it remained in effect throughout the program....
Manned Spacecraft Center notified Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama (which was responsible for managing NASA's Agena programs) that Project Gemini required 11 Atlas-Agenas as rendezvous targets and requested Marshall to procure them. The procurement request was accompanied by an Exhibit "A" describing proposed Gemini rendezvous techniques and defining the purpose of Project Gemini ns developing and demonstrating Earth-orbit rendezvous techniques as early as possible. If feasible, these techniques could provide a practical base for lunar and other deep space missions. Exhibit B to the purchase request was a Statement of Work for Atlas-Agenn vehicles to be used in Project Gemini. Air Force Space Systems Division, acting as a NASA contractor, would procure the 11 vehicles required. (Letter, Gllruth to Marshall, Attn: Dr. Werner von Braun, Director, Subj : Procurement of Atlas-Agena Space Vehicles, Jan. 31, 1962)
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Manned Spacecraft Center issued its second analysis of the Gemini program schedule. Unlike the first, it considered launch vehicles as well as the spacecraft. Procurement of the Agena target vehicle had been initiated so recently that scope for analysis in that area was limited. A key feature of engineering development for the Gemini program was the use of a number of test articles, the lack of which had sometimes delayed the Mercury program; although constructing these test articles might cause some initial delay in Gemini spacecraft construction, the data they would provide would more than compensate for any delay. No problems beset launch vehicle development, but the schedule allowed little contingency time for unexpected problems. The first unmanned qualification flight was still scheduled for late July or early August 1963, but the second (manned} flight was now planned for late October or early November 1963 and the first Agena flight for late April or early May 1964, with remaining flights to follow at two-month intervals, ending in mid-1965. Flight missions remained unchanged from the January analysis. (NASA-MSC, Gemini Project Office, "Project Gemini Schedule Analysis," Mar. 14, 1962.)
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Air Force Space Systems Division (SSD) awarded a letter contract to Lockheed Missiles and Space Company for eight Agena vehicles to be modified as Gemini Agena target vehicles (GATV). (Lockheed LMSC-A60l5200-2 and -7, Gemini Agena Target Vehicle Program Progress Reports: October 1964)
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Manned Spacecraft Center issued its third analysis of the Gemini program schedule. Spacecraft ground test plans had been formulated, and construction of test hardware had begun. Two boilerplate spacecraft had been added to the program to facilitate ground testing. Flight No. 2 was the first planned to use a paraglider, but the paraglider program required close attention to prevent schedule slippage; plans to substitute a parachute landing system for parraglider in this flight, should it prove necessary, had been initiated. Spacecraft manufacturing schedules were endangered by late delivery of components from vendors: chief threats to spacecraft No. 1 were components of the instrument and recording system and the inertial platform; for spacecraft No. 2, communication and electrical system components. No problems were anticipated with the booster. The analysis indicated no change in the launch schedule. (NASA-MSC, Gemini Project Offlce, "Project Gemini Schedule Analysis," May 4, 1962.)
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James E. Webb, NASA's new Administrator, reviewed the Gemini program. Project Gemini cost estimates at this point ($744.3 million) had increased substantially over the original estimate of $520 million. Estimated spacecraft cost had risen from $240.5 to $391.6 million; Titan II cost, from $113.0 to $161.8 million; Atlas-Agenn, from $88.0 to $106.3 million; and supporting development (including the paraglider program), from $29.0 to $36.8 million. Estimated operations costs had declined from $59.0 to $47.8 million. ("Memo, Holmes to Webb, Subj: Project Gemini cost estimates, Apr. 29, 1963, with enc., "Status of Project Gemini Cost Estimates.")
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George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, informed the staff of the Gemini Project Office (GPO) that all 12 Gemini flights would end in water landings, although Project Gemini Quarterly Report No. 8 for the period ending February 29, 1964, still listed the paraglider for the last three Gemini missions. At the GPO staff meeting of April 29, it was decided to reduce the level of activity on the paraglider program and begin to phase it out of the Gemini program. (Memo, Mathews to Stephen D. Armstrong, Subj: Contract NAS 9-170, Paraglider Recovery System, CCP No. 5, June 12, 1964)
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Manager Charles W. Mathews reported that the Gemini Program Office had been reviewing and evaluating plans for Gemini-Titan (GT) missions 4 through 7. GT-4 would be a four-day mission using battery power. GT-5 would include radar and a rendezvous evaluation pod for rendezvous exercises early in the flight. The duration of this mission would be open-ended for a period of seven days, contingent upon the availability of fuel cells. GT-6 would be a standard rendezvous mission of perhaps two days' duration. GT-7 would be a long-duration mission with an open-ended potential of 14 days. George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight, was currently reviewing these plans. ("MSC Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, July 10, 1964, p. 4.")
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In response to a request from NASA Headquarters, Gemini Program Office (GPO) provided a study for Gemini missions beyond the 12 originally planned. "The Advanced Gemini Missions Conceptual Study" described 16 further missions, including a space station experiment, a satellite chaser mission, a lifeboat rescue mission, and both a circumlunar and lunar orbiting mission. On February 28, 1965, GPO reported that a preliminary proposal for Gemini follow-on missions to test the land landing system had not been approved. Spare Gemini launch vehicles 13, 14, and 15 were canceled, and there were no current plans for Gemini missions beyond the approved 12-flight program. ("Memo, Manager, Gemini Program, to NASA Hq., Attn: W. C. Schneider, Subj: Advanced Gemini Missions, with enc., Sept. 18, 1964; Quarterly Status Report No. 12, p. 40.")
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Gemini Program Office (GPO) reported that it had initiated contractual action to delete the eighth Agena from the Gemini Agena target vehicle program. On March 6, 1965, GPO reported its decision to eliminate the seventh Agena as well. ("Weekly Activity Reports: Dec. 8-12, 1964, p. 3; Feb. 28-Mar. 6, 1965")
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Manned Spacecraft Center's (MSC) Gemini Program Office was abolished. The responsibility and authority for final Gemini activities, such as disposing of equipment and settling contract costs, were assigned to George F.Mac Dougall, Jr., the newly appointed Special Assistant for Gemini in MSC's Office of the Director of Administration. Wrapping up the program would require several years of gradually decreasing effort. (MSC Announcement No. 67-15, Feb. 1, 1967)